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NEGOTIATING INVESTMENT IN THE GATT:
A CALL FOR FUNCTIONALISM
Paul Bryan Christy III*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986, the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT)' announced the launch of the eighth round of
multilateral trade negotiations - the Uruguay Round. This round
was destined from its inception to test the stitching of the patchwork
of agreements forming the GATT. In addition to agriculture, subsi-
dies, and other long-time banes to multilateral trade negotiations, sev-
eral new subjects, including services, intellectual property, and
investment, would be discussed. For an agreement and an institution
never intended to become a central trade organization, there would
seem to be little remaining outside its ambit.
The GATT is a backwater. It began as a series of agreements for
the negotiation of tariff reductions and has developed into the only
generally accepted forum for the discussion of international economic
relations. Originally drafted as a trade agreement, the GATT regu-
lates trade in products. In this respect, the GATT is concerned not
with the actors in international trade, enterprises and nationals, but
with their output. This output-orientation has shaped much of the
development of post-war trade relations. Contracting Parties to the
GATT are now at a significant crossroads. New subjects have been
raised under its auspices and the pressure to entertain non-traditional,
non-output oriented discussions is growing. For some, this pressure is
irrelevant - the GATT is an agreement for the negotiation of reduc-
tions in barriers to trade in products. For these literalists, it is clear
that the GATT, as an agreement and as an institution, lacks the com-
petence to expand its jurisdiction.
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Functionalists, on the other hand, view economic liberalization as
the raison d'tre of the GATT; for them, changes in global economic
patterns require an evolution in the document which has, by both time
and default, become the best practical vehicle for minimizing eco-
nomic conflicts. The tension between literalism and functionalism -
the GATT as an end and the GATT as a means - has shaped the
discussion of investment in the Uruguay Round.
In part, this article is about the conflict between literalism and
functionalism in the GATT. 2 It examines an attempt in the Uruguay
Round to negotiate rules on foreign direct investment - the so-called
trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) negotiations. Foreign di-
rect investment is often a stage in the internationalization of enter-
prises; it is helpful to the trade of goods producers and necessary to the
trade of many services providers. Affected by the output-oriented his-
tory of the GATT, however, the Contracting Parties have treated in-
vestment as though it were simply one of three legs of an economic
triangle: goods, services, investment. In the Uruguay Round, this ap-
proach has yielded a hybrid: the TRIMs talks.
Part II of this article provides a background for examining interna-
tional investment law. This part defines investment, identifies the five
national controls on investment, and assesses the current need for mul-
tilateral investment rules. Part III examines the current state of inter-
national regulation of national investment controls by analyzing the
principal bilateral and multilateral agreements on investment: the
treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation (FCNs), bilateral in-
vestment treaties (BITs), and the multilateral OECD framework for
the discipline of investment controls. Part IV reviews the history of
investment and TRIMs discussions in the GATT, describes the nature
and incidence of TRIMs, and presents the current TRIMs debate.
In Part V, the major proposals for a TRIMs agreement are ex-
2. One author has described the conflicting interpretations of the purpose of the GATT as a
disagreement between "fundamentalists" who believe the GAIT "is based on a strictly legal
assessment of the scope of the treaty" and
a "reformist" group, whose opinion is shaped by an interpretation of the general purpose
and intentions of the treaty. [Reformists] do not regard the treaty as having specified any
explicit limits as to the areas and aspects of international economic exchange that it applies
to [and consider] appropriate and desirable the inclusion of any new measure that is found
to obstruct trade. Hence, the fundamentalists rely on a definition of measures, whereas the
reformists rely on a definition of effects.
P. NICOLAIDES, LIBERALIZING TRADE IN SERVICES 94-95 (1989).
This article categorizes the conflict as one between "literalists" and "functionalists" rather
than "fundamentalists" and "reformists" to emphasize the approaches to legal interpretation
taken by these groups. Literalists adhere to the black letter of the GAT; functionalists view the
GAT in light of its purpose: to liberalize economic relations. "Functionalist" is preferred to
"reformist" to emphasize that the difference between the two schools is in attitudes toward the
nature and scope of permissible GATT reforms.
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amined in light of GATT practice. This Part attempts to discover the
implications of these proposals for functionalism and the compatibility
of a completed TRIMs agreement with existing international trade
and investment law. Part VI concludes that the very structure of the
TRIMs talks indicates that GATT literalism remains a powerful con-
straint on the evolution of the General Agreement and that, while a
TRIMs agreement may have intrinsic value, the discussion of invest-
ment rules would be better left to another day.
Two very important scope limitations of this article must be stated.
The first is investment in services. Because of the triangular approach
to economic barriers taken in the Uruguay Round, investment issues
for services will not be covered by a TRIMs agreement. Instead, in-
vestment in services is being treated in the Uruguay Round as part of
an effort to create a General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
It is beyond the scope of this article to assess how the inclusion of
investment in a services agreement will affect a TRIMs agreement or
the concept of investment in the GATT. However, discussion about
investment under an agreement on trade in goods is likely to be rele-
vant to an agreement on services.3 The second limitation relates to
3. For this author, "investment in services" is a partially redundant phrase. In many cases,
service trade is less "trade" than it is direct foreign investment or labor migration or both. See
Bagwhati, Economic Perspectives on Trade in Professional Services, 1986 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 45,
48. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTRODUCTION
TO THE OECD CODES OF LIBERALISATION 22 (1987) [hereinafter INTRODUCTION TO THE
OECD CODES] ("From the viewpoint of liberalising international trade in services, the freedom
for international direct investment and establishment occupies a place of special importance....
For such key sectors as banking, financial services and insurance an established presence is essen-
tial .. "). Two studies have found that investment can be more important than trade to interna-
tional business in the service sector. Sauvant & Zimny, FDI and TNCs in Services, 20 CTC REP.,
Autumn 1985, at 24; Basche, Eliminating Barriers to International Trade and Investment in Serv-
ices, 200 CONF. BOARD RES. BULL. 4-5. See infra note 261 and accompanying text for further
discussion of the relationship between investment and services in current negotiations. As a
result, national controls on foreign investment may be the most significant barriers to interna-
tional service providers. See, e.g., Noyelle & Dutka, The Economics of the World Market for
Business Services: Implications for Negotiations on Trade in Services, 1986 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57,
77 (listing restrictions on local ownership, international payments, the mobility of professional
personnel, technology and information transfers, and the business scope of firms as five of the
seven types of restrictions faced by surveyed multinational service firms. Each of these can be
classed as a national control on investment). See infra notes 11-17 and accompanying text;
Rossi, Government Impediments and Professional Constraints on the Operations of International
Accounting Organizations, 1986 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 135, 153 (finding financial restrictions on
international payments the most important impediment to international accounting organiza-
tions). That the same provisions protecting investors in international investment agreements,
discussed infra part III, also generally govern the provision of services indicates a strong link
between the two in terms of regulation as well. Accordingly, those seeking to liberalize services
might do well to focus on the regulation of national investment controls generally rather than
attempt a framework for services modeled after an agreement on tariffs. Political opposition to
such an open treatment of investment might conversely lead to a conclusion to treat investment
entirely under the guise of services, but negotiators should be aware that is what they are doing.
Cf. U.S. NATIONAL STUDY ON TRADE IN SERVICES, A SUBMISSION BY THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 37-39 (1984) (empha-
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proposals to control the behavior of multinational enterprises (MNEs)
and to regulate their restrictive business practices (RBPs). The dis-
criminatory behavior of MNEs is often seen, particularly by develop-
ing countries, as a primary reason for nations to guard their powers to
control investment. Treatment of RBPs may be necessary in order to
obtain a broad consensus on any multilateral investment agreement.
However, RBPs relate to discriminatory actions by private enterprise
and so will also reluctantly be placed outside the scope of this article.
II. BACKGROUND
Investment has long been a forbidden subject in the context of the
GATT. While countries have been able to stomach the relatively
small loss in sovereignty that comes with multilateral trade discipline,
they have been extremely hesitant to do so in the area of investment.
Indeed, few subjects agitate the North-South division between the
haves and the have-nots more than the issue of limiting the rights of
countries to control foreign investment within their territories. This
Part begins by defining investment. It then identifies the five types of
controls that nations apply to investors in their territories and con-
cludes with an assessment of the need for investment rules.
A. Definition of Investment
Treaties have given several different definitions to investment. The
International Monetary Fund defines foreign direct investment, the
subject of this article, as an "investment that is made to acquire a last-
ing interest in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that
of the investor, the investor's purpose being to have an effective voice
in the management of the enterprise."'4 The Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement5 defines investment to mean the establishment
of a new business or the acquisition of an existing business. Invest-
ment specifically includes this business "as carried on" and controlled
by the investor, as well as the investor's original investment interest in
the business enterprise. 6 The International Centre for Settlement of
sizing a need to digtinguish trade in services from investment in services in order to discuss the
trade issues in the GA'T); Feketekuty, Trade in Professional Services: An Overview, 1986 U.
Cmi. LEGAL F. 1, 27 (raising the issue of whether, in the GATT, trade in services can be divorced
from investment since the GATT has already achieved such a separation with respect to goods
trade, which often entails investments in foreign markets). But see Bagwhati, supra, at 49
(describing this characterization as a means to make the discussion of services more palatable to
hesitant countries).
4. INT'L MONETARY FUND, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL 136 (1977).
5. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, United States-
Canada, art. 1611, 27 1.L.M. 281, 377.
6. Id.
[Vol. 12:743
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Investment Disputes (ICSID), the principal forum for arbitrating in-
ternational investment disputes, does not define investment at all in its
charter. 7 Perhaps the most comprehensive definition is attempted by
the U.S. bilateral investment treaties (BIT). The Model BIT defines
investment as "every kind of investment" and provides a long, but
expressly non-exhaustive, list of examples of covered investment as
well as a list of covered "activities associated with investment."8
For purposes of this article, investment refers to foreign direct in-
vestment - the situation where a national or business entity (such as a
corporation or partnership) of one country owns or controls assets or
property rights in another country. "Actual control" is difficult to
measure. The Department of Commerce has established a threshold
of ten percent ownership for classifying investment as foreign direct
investment.9 As a matter of practice, control can be had at ownership
levels below this percentage and can be inconsequential at greater
levels. Foreign direct investment is to be distinguished from portfolio
investment in which the investor simply establishes some claim on an
asset for the purpose of realizing a return.10
B. National Controls on Investment
Countries exercise control on investment in five principal ways:
prohibitions or restrictions on the making of an investment (establish-
ment restrictions), limitations or requirements on the operation of an
enterprise (operating requirements), restrictions on the right of entry
by those connected with the investment (personnel entry restrictions),
and limitations or requirements on the financial relationship between
an investor and the investment (financial restrictions). II The fifth con-
7. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, opened for signature Aug. 27, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575
U.N.T.S. 159.
8. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. I (Office of the United States Trade Representa-
tive 1990) [hereinafter Model BIT]; see also Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. I (Office of
the United States Trade Representative 1983), reprinted in Recent Developments, Developing a
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 273, 301 to A-14 (1983) (here-
inafter Original Model BIT]. See infra part III(A)(2).
9. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. DIRECT INVEST-
MENT ABROAD: 1982 BENCHMARK SURVEY DATA 2 (1985) [hereinafter 1982 BENCHMARK
SURVEY].
10. Id. at 2. The Department of Commerce defines direct investment abroad as "the owner-
ship or control, directly or indirectly, by one U.S. person of 10 percent or more [the U.S. domes-
tic benchmark for control interests] of the voting securities of an incorporated foreign business
enterprise or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated foreign business enterprise." Portfolio
investment is any investment that does not fit within that definition.
11. These five categories will provide a framework for ordering the array of investment im-
pediments and for comparing the competence of existing and proposed investment agreements.
See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1021 (1986). The au-
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trol, expropriation, is an established sovereign right and poses ques-
tions in a trade or investment agreement context principally with
respect to the amount of compensation for a taking. 12 This article fo-
cuses on the first four controls.
Investment barriers are pervasive. The United States cites eighteen
countries for their barriers to investment in its 1990 report on foreign
trade barriers. 13 Establishment restrictions are common. These may
take the form of an absolute prohibition of any foreign investment,
prohibition of investment in certain sectors, or limits or requirements
on the amount or percentage of foreign ownership.14
Limitations or requirements on the operation of enterprises include
a vast array of devices by governments intended to direct the conduct
of an enterprise in accordance with the economic, health, safety, or
political objectives of the host country. These measures include re-
quirements to employ host country nationals, to import or export in
specified amounts or to certain destinations, to manufacture goods,
and to transfer technology to the host country. These comprise the
majority of the measures considered TRIMs. 15
Personnel entry restrictions differ from employment requirements
by limiting the ability of an investor to bring in the management per-
sonnel or professional service people (e.g., accountants, architects, and
lawyers) necessary for the planning and conduct of the investment. 16
Financial restrictions generally take the form of restrictions or re-
quirements on the ability of the investor to remit profits or earnings
(remittance restrictions) or to access foreign exchange (exchange re-
strictions). They may also be imposed in connection with an expropri-
ation by compensating the home country investor in host country
currency or at an unfavorable rate of exchange. Financial restrictions
may be imposed to improve a country's balance of payments position
thors categorize national investment controls in three ways: direct controls on the making of an
investment, rules that govern the investor's financial relationship with the investment, and limita-
tions placed on the business activities of the investor and the investment. See also Basche supra
note 3, at 8 (indicating the variety of barriers which exist for investors).
12. See generally I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 531-45 (3d
ed. 1979) (on expropriation); Model BIT, supra note 8, art. III (requiring that expropriation be
made only for a public purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, upon prompt compensation,
and in accordance with due process of law).
13. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1990 NATIONAL TRADE
ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 216 (1990) (The list includes both developed
and developing countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Peoples Republic of China, Colombia,
France, Greece, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Phil-
ippines, Taiwan, Thailand).
14. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 11, at 1021.
15. See infra part IV(B)(2). See generally J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 1I, at 1021.
16. See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 3, at 154; Noyelle & Dutka, supra note 3, at 80-81.
[Vol. 12:743
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or to influence the import or export behavior of investors. 17
C. The Need for International Investment Rules
In international economic law, rules provide guidance. While
agreements may provide recourse for their breach, the practical value
of rules is an articulation of objective standards against which govern-
ments may judge themselves and may expect to be judged by their
treaty partners and by the global community. As neutral guidelines,
rules help to minimize power politics, and as articulated obligations,
rules operate to restrict caprice. Both of these factors enhance global
stability.
As will be seen, international investment rules have historically
been established in bilateral agreements. However, those who would
continue this past ignore that history can no longer comfortably pre-
dict the nationality of today's investor; the size, direction, or nature of
her investment; or significantly, the identities of those countries who
would use protectionist rules to restrict her investment. The national-
ity, growth, and direction of investment have changed and, as so often
occurs in economic redistribution, so has the politics.
Several economic phenomena make investment rules a more sali-
ent topic for trade negotiators today than it was some forty years ago.
First, as phrased by Professor Jackson, "[t]he receding waters of tariff
and other overt protection inevitably uncovers the rocks and shoals of
a variety of other barriers." 18 To some degree then, the GATT and its
Contracting Parties are victims of their past successes.
Perhaps as a result of trade liberalization, the growth of multina-
tional enterprises has cast abroad the net of developed country inter-
ests to a degree never before experienced. Total worldwide outflows of
investment tripled between 1984 and 1987.19 From 1975 to 1985, the
value of outward investment by the United States rose from $124 bil-
lion to $251 billion20 and is today in excess of $370 billion.21 The total
17. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC ARGU-
MENTS IN FAVOUR OF MULTILATERAL DISCIPLINES FOR TRIMS 4, 7 (Note by the Secretariat;
Informal Workshop with Dynamic Asian Economies, The International Trading Environment-
Issues and Policies, Seoul, Mar. 20 & 21, 1990) [hereinafter Secretariat Note].
18. Jackson, Introduction, in EMERGING STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND IN-
VESTMENT 2 (S. Rubin & G. Hufbauer eds. 1984).
19. FDI Flows in the Mid-1980s, 27 CTC REP., Spring 1989, at 16-17 (note that significant
measurement problems exist for investment and so all figures in this section should be considered
approximate. The measurement difficulties are explained in the source).
20. The Process of Transnationalization in the 1980s, 26 CTC REP., Autumn 1988, at 8.
21. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S. Direct Investment Abroad:
Detail for Position and Balance of Payment Flows, 1989, 70 SURV. OF CURRENT BUS., Aug. 1990,
at 56.
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outward investment of Canada, West Germany, Japan, the Nether-
lands, the United Kingdom, and the United States more than doubled
from $225 billion to $580 billion over the ten year period ending in
1985.22
The United States continues to be the world's largest home coun-
try, and the share of outflows of both Germany and Japan has in-
creased in recent years.23 The U.S. share of outward global
investment has declined steadily since the 1960s and peaked as a per-
centage of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) in the late 1970s. 24 In
contrast, Germany and Japan have rapidly increased their percentages
of world investment, and the ratio of outward investment to GDP for
Japan, Canada, and nearly all the West European countries has in-
creased sharply. 25
Not only does the United States have a high level of exposure to
national investment controls, but it also possesses the greatest power
to affect investment by other nations. Today, the United States is the
world's largest host country.26 In 1985, total investment in the United
States was more than six times the level of 1975, rising from $28 bil-
lion to $185 billion. Japan's relatively small level of inward invest-
ment quadrupled to $6 billion, and investment in Western Europe
nearly doubled reaching $184 billion.27
Not only are developed countries increasing their investments
among themselves, but also they are decreasing their investments into
developing countries. Developing countries' percentage of global in-
ward investment has declined since the mid-1970s. 28 Total inflows
dropped to $9.5 billion in 1984 from an annual average of $14 billion
in the 1975-79 period. 29 High external debt, general political and eco-
nomic instability, as well as a rise in technology intensive investment
in developed countries account for part of the relative decline. 30 Much
of today's investment in developing countries is related either to in-
vestment in offshore financial centers or to investment in flags of
22. Process of Transnationalization, supra note 20, at 7.
23. FDI Flows in the Mid-1980s, supra note 19, at 16.
24. Process of Transnationalization, supra note 20, at 6-7.
25. Id.
26. FDI Flows in the Mid-] 980s, supra note 19, at 18.
27. Process of Transnationalization, supra note 20, at 8.
28. Tolentino, Overall Trends of Foreign Direct Investment, 29 CTC REP., Spring 1990, at 28;
FDI Flows in the Mid-1980s, supra note 19, at 16-17; Recent Trends in FDI 1975-1985, 26 CTC
REP., Autumn 1988, at 9.
29. Recent Trends in International Direct Investment No. 146, OECD OBSERVER, June/July
1987, at 32, 33.
30. Tolentino, supra note 28, at 28.
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convenience. 3i
Services are a major contributor to increased flows in investment.
Investment and trade in services have supplanted manufacturing and
trade in goods as the engine for economic growth in developed coun-
tries. In 1987, private sector service industries accounted for two-
thirds of U.S. GNP while manufacturing contributed only about one-
fifth.3 2 Investment by service industries varies between twenty-five
and fifty percent of the total stock of investment in most host coun-
tries, and it has been estimated that about forty percent of the total
world stock, and fifty percent of the annual new flow, of investment is
in services. 33 It is also relevant to the growing importance of invest-
ment to trade to note that "maybe half" of the stock of existing invest-
ment in services is owned by industrial (goods producing) parent
enterprises.34 Thus, investment not only is an activity common to
goods producers and services providers but also one that links the two.
The new rise of investment into developed countries has not been
received with universal favor. One scholar has noted a "role-reversal"
in attitude toward foreign investment with developing countries mani-
festing increased interest in investment by reducing restrictions and
major capital exporting countries worrying that investment in their
territories will impair their sovereignty, national welfare, or security. a5
Investment into the United States, by Japanese enterprises in particu-
lar, has become a political issue giving rise to cries for heightened scru-
tiny on national security grounds of foreign acquisitions of United
States corporations and for increased reporting requirements for the
affiliates of foreign enterprises.3 6 The European Communities have
31. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL
DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE NEW ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 39, 40 (1989).
32. INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES TRADE PERFORM-
ANCE IN 1987, at 47 (1988).
33. B. Hoekman & R. Stern, Evolving Patterns of Trade and Investment in Services 23 (Oct.
1989) (Research Seminar in International Economics, Department of Economics, The University
of Michigan, Seminar Discussion Paper No. 250).
34. There is reason to believe that maybe half of the stock of existing FDI in services
reflects the establishment of service affiliates by firms whose primary activity is industrial
(i.e., goods related) in nature. In large part these investments appear to be directed towards
financial and distribution-related activities and are intended to support parent-firm produc-
tion and sales. Thus, much of the investment in finance and distribution is not independent.
Id. at 24.
35. Rubin, Corporations, Conduct and Codes: Investment and Trade in the Uruguay Round,
29 CTC REP., Spring 1990, at 20.
36. See, e.g., Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021,
102 Stat. 1107, 1425-26 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (1988)). This is the Exon-Florio
Amendment which authorizes the President to suspend or prohibit any merger, acquisition, or
takeover by foreign persons when such an action is determined to threaten to impair national
security. For a criticism of the political nature of the Exon-Florio Amendment, see Note, Pro-
posals for Limiting Foreign Investment Risk Under the Exon-Florio Amendment, 42 HASTINGS
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similarly bristled against Japanese and Southeast Asian investment in
low value-added, so-called "screwdriver" operations, which are con-
sidered attempts to circumvent EC antidumping rules.37 Japanese
companies have responded to actual or threatened trade and invest-
ment protectionism by replacing exports with direct investment
abroad.38 The politics of investment is growing.
For example, the United States has begun to use its unilateral trade
weapon, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 39 to achieve its goals in
the investment area. Section 301 authorizes the President to retaliate
with trade measures against certain unfair trade practices by foreign
governments. 40 In 1985, the United States initiated an investigation of
Brazil with a view toward section 301 actions.4' In 1989, the U.S.
government cited India under the so-called Super 301 provisions of the
1988 Trade Act42 for its forty percent limitation on foreign equity
ownership and for requiring both export performance and local con-
tent commitments of investors.43 Further, section 307 of the Trade
and Tariff Act of 1984 authorizes the United States Trade Representa-
L.J. 1175 (1991). See also H.R. 5410, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 9605-07 (1988).
This, the proposed Bryant Amendment to the 1988 Trade Act, would have required registration
and greater reporting by foreign-owned companies in the United States. But see E. GRAHAM &
P. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 115 (1989):
The most important point about the Bryant amendment and similar bills is that, although
mild in their current form, they would mark a broad departure of US policy from neutrality
regarding nationality of ownership. They would impose on all foreign-owned firms a set of
reporting requirements purely because they are foreign.
Examples of fodder for those who would discriminate against investment by foreign entities
include the Sony acquisition of Columbia Pictures, the Matsushita acquisition of MCA, and
Fujitsu's attempted acquisition of Fairchild Semiconductor. Japan has made its U.S. investments
in part as a means to circumvent the political tensions arising from the U.S. trade deficit. A shift
in focus by the United States should make Japan particularly interested in establishing multilat-
eral investment rules.
37. See, e.g., EEC-Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components GATT" Doc. L/6657
(Mar. 22, 1990) (Screwdriver Panel Decision), reprinted in 2 WORLD TRADE MATERIALS 5
(1990).
38. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 31, at
22.
39. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411 (1988) (as amended)).
40. Id.
41. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Initiation of Investigation Under Section 301:
Brazil's Informatics Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,608-09 (1985) (notices); J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY,
supra note 11, at 1034.
42. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301, 102 Stat.
1107, 1164-68 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)).
43. India's Import Policies are 'Out of Step' with Other Third World Nations, Hills Says, 7
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 508 (1990); US. Will Not Retaliate Against India Under Super 301,
USTR Hills Announces, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 893 (1990) (U.S. Trade Representative
Hills chose not to retaliate under the law because the GATT Contracting Parties were simultane-
ously negotiating investment rules in the Uruguay Round. The USTR reserved the right to
retaliate if the GATT talks are unsuccessful).
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tive to impose import restrictions on the products or services of coun-
tries maintaining export performance requirements. 44 Such unilateral
measures operate outside of the GATT dispute settlement process and
impeach the spirit of multilateralism.
In this environment in which traditional home countries are major
host countries, it becomes important to develop a rules-oriented
framework for the regulation of investment not only to protect devel-
oped countries from the discriminatory practices most often attributed
to developing countries, but also to protect developed countries from
themselves. Without adequate rules, countries are apt to pursue more
politically expedient, power-oriented approaches to investment con-
trol. A major contribution of the GATT has been its emphasis on a
rules-oriented approach to trade and economic relations; in so doing,
the GATT has done much to avoid the economic conflicts which are
at the root of so many political frictions. 45
III. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
There is no international structure for regulating investment or the
controls nations apply to investment. 46 While no overarching disci-
plines exist, significant efforts have been made bilaterally by many na-
tions and multilaterally by the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). This part explores existing
agreements for the regulation of national investment controls. In ad-
dition to the terms of the obligations, the reader should note the object
of the protections afforded. Unlike the GATT, each of the agreements
analyzed in this part protects actors in international commerce: per-
sons and enterprises. The GATT, in contrast, focuses on the treat-
ment of output: products. There is some question as to whether
44. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 307, 98 Stat. 2948, 3012 (codified at
19 U.S.C. §§ 2112(g)(3), 2114d (1988)).
45. See generally J- JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 85-88 (1989) (discussion of
the rules-oriented versus the power-oriented approach to international law).
46. E.g., Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 3, 47 (Judgment of Feb. 5). In discussing the status of law on foreign investments, the
International Court of Justice commented that "no generally accepted rules in the matter have
crystallized on the international plane." The Court did note, however, that "a more thorough
examination of the facts" would reveal that "the law on the subject has been formed" at least
concerning "essentially bilateral relations." This is still the case today. Sornarajah, State Re-
sponsibility and Bilateral Investment Treaties, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 79, 80-83 ("It would be
futile to argue that any rules have crystallized in this area in the fifteen years since the [Barcelona
Traction] judgment." The author noted the existence of bilateral treaties but concluded that they
constituted lex specialis which could not be generalized into a new law of investment protection).
See also McCulloch & Owen, Linking Negotiations on Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, in
THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN THE 1980s 334, 349 (C. Kindleberger & D. Audretsch
eds. 1982) ("IT]here is virtually no international fiamework governing policies toward foreign
investment.").
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investment can be effectively discussed, let alone liberalized, in an out-
put oriented framework. 47
A. Bilateral Investment Agreements
There have long been bilateral agreements covering the concerns of
investors. The traditional agreement in this regard is the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN). More recently, the
bilateral investment treaty (BIT) has supplanted the FCN as the pre-
ferred instrument for regulating investment controls. Both of these
agreements address the five controls on investment and oblige host
countries to accord minimum levels of treatment to investors. 48
1. Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN)
For the United States, the FCN antedates the Articles of Confeder-
ation and has long been a mainstay for declaring and conducting rela-
tions with other countries. 49 The typical FCN covers the entry, travel,
and residence of nationals; basic personal freedoms; property rights;
the conduct and control of business enterprises; taxation; exchange re-
strictions on currency conversion; exchange of goods; navigation; and
other issues, including dispute settlement. 50
After the creation of the GATT, the need for bilateral trade ar-
rangements declined, and the FCN took on greater responsibility for
the regulation of national investment controls. 51 In the FCNs negoti-
ated in the interwar period, beginning with the German treaty of
1923,52 only one article out of thirty governed the establishment, con-
duct, and protection of enterprises. In the post-GATT period, invest-
ment provisions accounted for roughly half of the total provisions in
the FCN. 53 The United States, in particular, placed increasing empha-
47. The same doubts are raised with regard to services and with even greater immediacy
given the discussion of a services framework, the so-called General Agreement on Trade and
Services (GATS), in the Uruguay Round.
48. The U.S. free trade agreement with Canada also addresses investment, but it will not be
examined here.
49. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Feb. 6, 1788, United States-France, 8 Stat. 12, T.S. No.
83. See also Metzger, Commercial Treaties of the United States and Private Foreign Investment,
19 FED. B.J. 367 (1959).
50. Metzger, supra note 49, at 367.
51. See Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L.
REV. 805, 806 (1958); Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Invest-
ment: Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 234 (1956) [hereinafter Treaties for
the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment].
52. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, Dec. 8, 1923, United States-Ger-
many, 44 Stat. 2132, T.S. No. 725.
53. Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment, supra note 51, at
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sis on investment in post-war FCNs as a means to shore up, by articu-
lating legal principles, the drifting and uncertain sands of customary
international investment law. 54
The FCN provides rights and obligations with respect to each of
the five classes of national investment controls: establishment restric-
tions, operating requirements, personnel entry restrictions, financial
restrictions, and expropriation. 55 Article VII of the Standard Draft
FCN 56 is the core provision for both investment and services.
Article VII limits a party's use of establishment restrictions and
operating requirements by guaranteeing national treatment (treatment
upon terms no less favorable than that accorded by a country to its
like domestic nationals, products, or entities in like situations) and
most favored nation (MFN) treatment (treatment no less favorable
than that accorded by a country, in like situations, to the like nation-
als, products, or entities of any third country) to the other party's na-
tionals and enterprises. National treatment is accorded with respect to
"engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, financial and other
activity for gain."" 7 By the terms of this article, a company has the
same right as a domestic enterprise to establish and maintain
branches, agencies, offices, factories, and other facilities appropriate to
the conduct of its business; to organize companies under general com-
pany laws; and to control and manage enterprises that it has ac-
quired. 58 Thus, the rights to establish and to conduct business are
granted on terms equal to the better of those afforded national or for-
eign enterprises. These rights exist for an enterprise whether its out-
put is a product or a service - the enterprise need only be constituted
under the laws and regulations of a party.59
National treatment of nationals and enterprises is a broad commit-
ment and, as might be expected, is not without exceptions. The excep-
tions to national treatment generally arise only for the service sectors.
Parties may screen the activities of certain service sector aliens on pub-
54. G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 135,
187 (1969). This book provides an in-depth tour of the history and development of international
investment law with particular emphasis on attempts to establish multilateral disciplines. It is
oft-cited for its extensive bibliography on the subject of investment.
55. See Metzger, supra note 49, at 368.
56. A standard draft FCN has been prepared by Charles H. Sullivan in a study for the De-
partment of State (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Sullivan Study]. This study is a compre-
hensive work on the history and meaning of FCN provisions.
57. Standard Draft FCN, art. VII, in id. at 11.
58. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-
Japan, art. VII, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2069, T.I.A.S. No. 2863, at 8, 206 U.N.T.S. 143, 198.
59. Standard Draft FCN, art. XXII(3), in Sullivan Study, supra note 56, at 42.
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lic policy grounds:6°
Each Party reserves the right to limit the extent to which aliens may
establish, acquire interest in, or carry on enterprises engaged within its
territories in communications, air or water transport, banking involving
depository or fiduciary functions, or the exploitation of land or other
natural resources. 6 1
However, even where these exceptions apply, the parties undertake to
accord MFN treatment.62
The exceptions to national treatment are further qualified to pro-
hibit either party from denying to the other's transportation, commu-
nications, and banking companies the "right to maintain branches and
agencies to perform functions necessary for essentially international
operations in which they are permitted to engage."'63 Parties may give
differential treatment with respect to "special formalities" that are im-
material to the investment but that differ from the requirements for
national enterprises, e.g., registration requirements for foreign
investors."4
As further evidence of the difficulty of achieving commitments not
to discriminate in the services sectors, most FCNs negotiated after
1953 include a reservation to national treatment for "professional
services" 65 in an attached protocol. This has been done both because
of varied U.S. state laws on professions and as a means to form a "bas-
ket" category for the most common concerns of FCN partners about
including certain service occupations within the national treatment ob-
ligation. 66 The FCN does not define "professional services"; 67 the
class refers generally to occupations with a "public function." 68
60. Id. at 139.
61. Id., art. VII(2), at 12.
62. Id., art. VII(4), at 13.
63. Id., art. VII(2), at 12. This provision attempts to ensure that, where a business is not
prohibited on policy grounds, its international operations will not be inhibited by restrictions on
activities associated with the conduct of its operations. Such activities might include selling tick-
ets, booking cargo, promoting sales for transportation companies, maintaining transmission facil-
ities for communications companies, issuing letters of credit and traveler's checks, and servicing
loans in the case of banking enterprises. Id. at 151.
64. Id. at 152.
65. This is paragraph 3 of the Protocol to the Standard Draft FCN. Id. at 48. Paragraph 4
of the Protocol conditions MFN treatment for mining activities in the public domain on recipro-
cal treatment by the other party. Id. at 48-49. This provision accommodates a requirement in
the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 181. Sullivan Study, supra note 56, at 159.
66. Sullivan Study, supra note 56, at 156-57.
67. Id. at 158.
68. Id. at 156. The only exceptions to national treatment in the Standard Draft FCN are
made in the services sectors, yet national treatment for services is being negotiated in the Uru-
guay Round. It is ironic, therefore, that national treatment for investment has been considered
by some parties to be an untenable encroachment of sovereignty and outside the scope of the
GATT and of the Uruguay Round investment talks, the TRIMs negotiations. See infra part IV.
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The Standard Draft FCN proscribes personnel entry restrictions
by providing for the free migration of persons connected with an in-
vestment. Nationals of either party have a right of entry for, among
other purposes, carrying on trade and developing and directing the
operations of an enterprise in which they have invested or are in the
process of investing. 69 Article VIII provides investors with the right
to "engage, within the territories of the other Party, accountants and
other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and
other specialists of their choice" in connection with the planning and
operation of the foreign enterprises.70
For financial restrictions, article XII obliges each party to accord
national and MFN treatment with respect to payments, remittances,
and transfers of funds or financial instruments between the two territo-
ries or between one party and a third country. 71 The article generally
defers to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and is in fact meant
to supplement the IMF Articles of Agreement by giving guidance and
priority to even those restrictions permitted by the IMF.7 2 Exchange
restrictions, defined as "all restrictions, regulations, charges, taxes, or
other requirements imposed by either Party which burden or interfere
with payments, remittances, or transfers of funds or of financial instru-
ments,"'73 must not be imposed "in a manner unnecessarily detrimen-
tal or arbitrarily discriminatory to the claims, investments, transport,
trade, and other interests of nationals and companies of the other
Party, nor to the competitive position thereof.' ' 74 This language is in-
tended to prohibit the use of exchange restrictions as a protective de-
vice by limiting their use to times of monetary reserve imbalance.75
Finally, the FCN builds upon the general principle of international
law requiring compensation in the case of expropriation by requiring
that such compensation be "just" and in "an effectively realizable
form."' 76 National and most-favored-nation treatment are guaranteed
69. Standard Draft FCN, art. lI(l), in Sullivan Study, supra note 56, at 3.
70. Id., art. VIII(l), at 14.
71. Id., art. XII(l), at 22.
72. Id., art. XII(2), at 22. The IMF Articles of Agreement are concerned only with restric-
tions on current transactions and not capital transactions. Second Amendment of Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Apr. 30, 1976, art. VIII(2)(a), 29 U.S.T. 2203,
2223, T.I.A.S. No. 8937. The IMF also does not prioritize restrictions once they are in effect.
Standard Draft FCN Article XII attempts to improve investor security by supplementing the
IMF Articles of Agreement in this discretionary area. Sullivan Study, supra note 56, at 207.
73. Standard Draft FCN, art. XII(5), in Sullivan Study, supra note 56, at 24.
74. Id., art. XII(4), at 23-24.
75. Id. at 219.
76. Id., art. VI(4), at 10.
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as minimum standards for expropriation. 77
In sum, the FCN offers a paradigm of a proper investment agree-
ment. The focus of the agreement is on treatment accorded to those
who would experience the burden of inequitable treatment: nationals
and companies. In contrast, under the GATT, investor rights are de-
rivative of the obligations taken by the Contracting Parties to accord
certain tariff and non-discriminatory treatment to products. GATT
literalists would require a "link" between a government investment
measure and trade in a product before that agreement could be in-
voked. The FCN avoids this tangle.
The reservation provisions for certain services sectors illustrate the
difficulty of achieving blanket commitments not to discriminate. It is
clear from this history that any investment agreement in the GATT
would have to address these concerns, but given the diversity of FCN
parties, it would not appear to be an impossible task to obtain some
minimal level of multilateral acceptance for an investment
agreement. 78
The FCN is a versatile document with a long history in the United
States, Europe, Asia, and the rest of the world. A rapid rise in inter-
national trade, culminating in the GATT, decreased the FCN's trade
function; similarly, an increase in international investment has de-
creased the apparent efficacy of the agreement for investment. Since
1948, the United States has entered twenty-three FCN treaties; the last
were signed with Thailand and Togo in 1966. 79 Recently, the United
States has chosen to forgo the FCN in favor of the bilateral investment
treaty as its framework for negotiating investment rights and
obligations.
2. Bilateral Investment. Treaties (BITs)
In 1982, the United States followed several European countries
and Japan in initiating a program of bilateral investment treaties
(BITs).80 The United States is a relative newcomer to the BIT; Ger-
many was among the first to sign such an agreement in 1960. s 1
77. Id., art. VI(5), at 10.
78. In the post-1940 period, when investment became a more significant issue in the FCNs,
the following countries entered FCNs with the U.S.: Belgium, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland,
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxem-
bourg, Muscat and Oman, The Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Taiwan, Thailand, Togo, and
Vietnam. Id. at 51-54.
79. Seidman, Foreign Private Investors and the Host Country, 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 637,
640-41 (1985).
80. See generally Original Model BIT, supra note 8, at 273.
81. Sornarajah, supra note 46, at 79.
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France, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Japan are among the
other developed countries which maintain BIT programs. 2 Singa-
pore-Sri Lanka and Kuwait-Iraq are two of the few BITs between de-
veloping countries.8 3 Like the Standard Draft FCN, a United States
Model BIT has been created84 - the first draft of which was released
in 1983.85
To a significant extent, the Model BIT represents simply a refine-
ment of FCN provisions. Like the FCN, the agreement provides
rights and obligations with respect to each of the five principal con-
trols on investment. For both the establishment and operation of in-
vestment, the Model BIT guarantees the better of national or MFN
treatment, subject to listed reservations. 86 The list of reservations is
long but, upon examination, appears to be largely a more detailed ac-
count of the reservations to national treatment found in the FCN.
Under both the FCN and the BIT, parties remain free to maintain
nondiscriminatory establishment prohibitions. Unlike the FCN, how-
ever, national and MFN obligations do not include benefits accorded
by a party to another country by virtue of a free trade area or customs
union agreement, or more recently, subsequent obligations negotiated
under the framework of the GATT. 87
With respect to the operations of an enterprise, the Model BIT also
explicitly prohibits performance requirements imposed as a condition
of "establishment, expansion or maintenance of investments.188 Pro-
scribed performance requirements are measures that "require or en-
82. Original Model BIT, supra note 8, at 275-76; J. JACKSON, supra note 45, at 29.
83. Sornarajah, supra note 46, at 79.
84. Model BIT, supra note 8.
85. Original Model BIT, supra note 8.
86. Model BIT, supra note 8, art. II. In the annex to the Model BIT, the United States
reserves the right to "make or maintain limited exceptions to national treatment" in the follow-
ing sectors or matters:
air transportation; ocean and coastal shipping; banking; insurance; government grants; gov-
ernment insurance and loan programs; energy and power production; custom house brokers;
ownership of real property; ownership and operation of broadcast or common carrier radio
and television stations; ownership of shares in the Communications Satellite Corporation;
the provision of common carrier telephone and telegraph services; the provision of subma-
rine cable services; use of land and natural resources; mining on the public domain; mari-
time services and maritime-related services; and primary dealership in U.S. government
securities.
Id., annex, para. 1.
The United States reserves the right to "to make or maintain limited exceptions" to MFN in
"ownership of real property; mining on the public domain; maritime-related services; and pri-
mary dealership in United States government securities." Id., annex, para. 2.
87. Model BIT, supra note 8, art. II, paras. 9(a), 9(b).
88. "Neither party shall impose performance requirements as a condition of establishment,
expansion or maintenance of investments, which require or enforce commitments to export
goods produced, or which specify that goods or services must be purchased locally, or which
impose any other similar requirements." Id., art. II, para. 5.
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force commitments to export goods produced, or which specify that
goods or services must be purchased locally, or which impose any
other similar requirements." 89 Moreover, the agreement includes a
general obligation to accord "fair and equitable" 90 treatment at all
times, and prohibits either party from "in any way impair[ing] by arbi-
trary and discriminatory measures the management, operation, main-
tenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, expansion, or disposal of
investments." 9'
The Model BIT provides for a right of entry by personnel for the
purpose of operating or establishing an investment.92 The BIT builds
upon the FCN with an explicit grant of a right to engage "top manage-
rial personnel" regardless of nationality. 93
When dealing with financial transfers, the Model BIT states that a
party shall permit "all transfers related to an investment to be made
freely and without delay into and out of its territory." 94 This is a
higher standard than the national and MFN treatment accorded by
the FCN. Here, a right of transfer is guaranteed. The FCN ensured
only nondiscriminatory treatment, but gave no fundamental right to
free transfers. Transfers expressly include: returns, compensation for
expropriation, payments arising out of an investment dispute, pay-
ments made under a contract (including amortization of loan principal
and accrued interest payments), proceeds from the sale or liquidation
of an investment, and contributions to capital. 95 Transfers are to be
made in a "freely usable currency" at the prevailing market exchange
rate on the transfer date.96
The BIT subjects the sovereign right of a nation to expropriate
property to the requirements that it be for a public purpose, in a non-
discriminatory manner, and upon payment of "prompt, adequate and
effective compensation" which is equivalent to the fair market value of
the expropriated property in accordance with due process.97
Finally, the Model BIT makes substantial change to the FCN in
the event of a dispute by enabling a national or company of a party to
89. Id.
90. Id., art. II, para. 2(a).
91. Id., art. II, para. 2(b).
92. Id., art. II, para. 3.
93. Id., art. II, para. 4.
94. Id., art. IV, para. 1.
95. Id.
96. Id., art. IV, para. 2. Exception is made for transfers upon expropriation in which case
the provisions covering expropriation apply, i.e., "prompt, adequate and effective compensation"
shall be paid. Id., art. III, para. 1.
97. Id., art. III, para. 1.
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invoke its settlement provisions.9" The Model BIT refers investment
disputes to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes (ICSID).99 The Standard Draft FCN makes no provision for the
nationals or companies of a party to invoke its provisions.t°° The BIT
further asserts its competency for investment vis-d-vis the FCN by de-
fining investment and by specifically including activities associated
with investment. 101
Like the FCN, the object of the obligations undertaken in the BIT
relate to treatment accorded to companies and nationals of the parties.
The BIT makes its focus on investment more explicit by obligating
parties to "permit and treat investment, and activities associated there-
with, on a nondiscriminatory basis." Investment includes "every kind
of investment" and associated activities include the operation of
enterprises. "0 2
98. Paragraphs two and three of article VI of the Model BIT provide that if a dispute cannot
be resolved through consultation and negotiation between the parties, a "national or company"
concerned may choose to submit the dispute to the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID). Id., art. VI, paras. 2-3. An investment dispute is defined as:
a dispute involving (a) the interpretation or application of an investment agreement between
a Party and a national or company of the other Party; (b) the interpretation or application of
any investment authorization granted by a Party's foreign investment authority to such na-
tional or company; or (c) an alleged breach of any right conferred or created by this Treaty
with respect to an investment.
Id., art. VI, para. 1.
99. Id., arts. VI, VII.
100. See Original Model BIT, supra note 8, at 293.
101."Investment" means every kind of investment in the territory of one Party owned or
controlled directly or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party, such as equity,
debt, and service and investment contracts, and includes without limitation:
(i) tangible and intangible property, including rights such as mortgages, liens and pledges;
(ii) a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or interests in the assets
thereof;
(iii) a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic value, and associated
with an investment;
(iv) intellectual property which includes, inter alia, rights relating to:
literary and artistic works, including sound recordings,
inventions in all fields of human endeavor,
industrial designs,
semiconductor mask works,
trade secrets and confidential business information, and
trademarks, service marks, and trade names; and
(v) any right conferred by law or contract, and any licenses and permits pursuant to law.
Model BIT, supra note 8, art. I, para. l(a).
"[A]ssociated activities" include the organization, control, operation, maintenance and dis-
position of companies, branches, agencies, offices, factories or other facilities for the conduct
of business; the making, performance and enforcement of contracts; the acquisition, use,
protection and disposition of property of all kinds including intellectual and industrial prop-
erty rights; and the borrowing of funds, the purchase, issuance, and sale of equity shares and
other securities, and the purchase of foreign exchange for imports.
Id., art. I, para. l(e). Associated activities are specifically included. Id., art. II, para. i.
102. Id., art. II, para. 1. Investment is defined at id., art. I, para. l(a). Associated activities
are defined at id., art. I, para. 1(e).
In addition, the Model BIT contains a nonexhaustive list of examples of "associated activi-
ties" which mentions the granting of franchises or rights under licenses; access to registrations,
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Obligations with respect to personnel entry restrictions, financial
restrictions, and expropriation are phrased in terms of the link be-
tween the person, financial instrument, or expropriated asset, and the
covered investment. In this way, both the establishment and the oper-
ation of investments are protected from countries attempting to cir-
cumvent their investment obligations with immigration, financial, or
takings measures, or practices.
For the United States, the BIT marks an improvement over the
FCN in both the clarity and substance of its rights. For a developing
country BIT partner, acceptance of a BIT entails significant obliga-
tions not to use many of the restrictive devices common to the devel-
opment plans of similarly situated countries. Thus, for a significant
commitment by a developing country, the United States pays only its
right to deliberalize its market. For the partner, the BIT represents a
seal of approval on the country as an investment site for capital
exporters.
It is difficult to say whether the U.S. BIT program has been suc-
cessful - only seven U.S. BIT agreements are in force as of this writ-
ing. Although the United States has entered negotiations with twenty-
three countries since 1983, only those with Bangladesh,' 0 3 Came-
roon,'°4 Grenada,10 5 Panama,'0 6 Senegal, 10 7 Turkey, 08 and Zaire' °9
are in force today. Those with the Congo," 10 Haiti,1 '1 and Tunisia"12
await U.S. Senate approval. Negotiations are currently underway
licenses, permits, and other approvals; access to financial institutions and the funds held therein;
importation and exportation of business equipment; dissemination of commercial information;
marketing; access to public services; access to raw materials, inputs, and other services; and
access to credit markets. Id., art. II, para. 10.
103. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Mar.
12, 1986, United States-Bangladesh, Treaty Doc. 99-23, entered into force July 25, 1989.
104. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Feb.
26, 1986, United States-Cameroon, Treaty Doc. 99-22, entered into force Apr. 6, 1989.
105. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, May
2, 1986, United States-Grenada, Treaty Doc. 99-25, entered into force Mar. 3, 1989.
106. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Oct.
27, 1982, United States-Panama, Treaty Doc. 99-14, entered into force May 30, 1991.
107. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Dec.
6, 1983, United States-Senegal, Treaty Doc. 99-15, entered into force Oct. 25, 1990.
108. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Dec.
3, 1985, United States-Turkey, Treaty Doc. 99-19, entered into force May 18, 1990.
109. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Aug.
3, 1984, United States-Zaire, Treaty Doc. 99-17, entered into force July 28, 1989.
110. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Feb.
12, 1990, United States-Congo, Treaty Doc. 102-1, injunction of secrecy removed Mar. 19, 1991.
111. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Dec.
13, 1983, United States-Haiti, Treaty Doc. 99-16, injunction of secrecy removed Mar. 25, 1986.
112. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, May
15, 1991, United States-Tunisia, Treaty Doc. 102-6, injunction of secrecy removed May 20, 1991.
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with the Soviet Union, Argentina, Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Uruguay,
and Yugoslavia, and, more recently, formal talks have been initiated
with Bulgaria, Hungary, Jamaica, and Nigeria. 1 3 Egypt (the first
country to enter BIT negotiations with the United States), Morocco,
and Poland have yet to ratify their BITs."t 4
While overcoming many of the limitations of FCNs, BITs are not
perfect. It has been asserted that the value of bilateral investment
treaties lies in the articulation of customary international investment
law. ' 5 Yet from the list above it is clear that the U.S. BIT partner
countries are not representative of the world, nor, arguably, of the de-
veloping world. The United States has no BIT agreements with devel-
oped countries, though Canada and Australia allow significant levels
of foreign investment. Also, significant developing countries such as
India and Mexico have not entered BIT talks with the United
States. 1 6 For one commentator, variations in the terms of the agree-
ments make the value of the BIT as a statement of customary interna-
tional law suspect." 7 These terms have differed according to such
factors as the level of nationalist opposition to making concessions to
foreigners and concerns about loss of economic sovereignty, including
the right to counter the restrictive practices of multinational enter-
prises." 8 Many of these criticisms may be applied to non-U.S. BITs as
well. 119
B. Multilateral Investment Agreements
Though several attempts have been made since World War II,
there exists today no GATT-equivalent multilateral agreement for the
113. Conversation with Ivan Dubovsky, Office of the General Counsel, Office of the United
States Trade Representative (Feb. 1991).
114. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Sept.
29, 1982, United States-Egypt, Treaty Doc. 99-24, approved by Senate Oct. 20, 1988; Treaty
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, July 22, 1985, United
States-Morocco, Treaty Doc. 99-18, approved by Senate Oct. 20, 1988; Treaty Concerning Busi-
ness and Economic Relations, Mar. 21, 1990, United States-Poland, Treaty Doc. 101-18, ap-
proved by Senate Oct. 28, 1990.
115. "This extensive activity [in BIT negotiations] of states has attracted some scholarly
literature. The large number of the commentators view these treaties as entrenching what they
describe as customary principles of international law relating to the protection of foreign invest-
ment." Sornarajah, supra note 46, at 79-80. Sornarajah, however, rejects the notion that invest-
ment treaties embody any definite principle of international law. Id. at 97.
116. Id. at 82.
117. Id. at 97.
118. Id. at 82-83.
119. UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, BILATERAL INVEST-
MENT TREATIES 112-14 (1988). This work provides a good summary of the international BIT
programs.
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regulation of national investment controls. 120 The OECD, an organi-
zation of twenty-four developed nations, has produced the most signif-
icant framework for the liberalization of national investment
controls. ' 2'
The OECD framework for the regulation of national investment
controls consists of three principal instruments: 22 the 1976 Declara-
tion on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (Dec-
laration), 123 the Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements (Capital
Movements Code), 124 and the Code of Liberalization of Current Invis-
ible Operations (Invisibles Code). 25 These three agreements are sup-
plemented by binding OECD Decisions. Both the Capital Movements
Code and the Invisibles Code are binding on OECD member coun-
tries; the Declaration is only hortatory.126
120. Schwartzenberger cites four major attempts to negotiate investment rules on a multilat-
eral basis: the Havana Charter on Trade and Employment (1948), the Abs-Shawcross Draft
Convention on Investments Abroad (1959), and two versions of a Draft Convention on the Pro-
tection of Foreign Property (1962 and 1967). After these attempts failed, the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development sponsored the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (1965). G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, supra
note 54, at 136-38.
121. Several other international agreements relate to investment but do not attempt to regu-
late national investment controls directly. These include the UN Code of Conduct on Transna-
tional Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/1988/39/Add.1 (Feb 1, 1988) and the MIGA Convention
(Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Oct. 11, 1985, re-
printed in 24 I.L.M. 159). Also, the treaties which established the European Economic Commu-
nity (Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), Mar. 25, 1957,
art. 52-58, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 37-38) and the European Free Trade Association (Convention Es-
tablishing the European Free Trade Association (Stockholm Convention), Jan. 4, 1960, art. 16,
370 U.N.T.S. 1, 16) each contain provisions liberalizing national investment controls. See gener-
ally Establishment: The Bergen Agreement Explained, 7 EFTA BULL., Dec. 1966, at 11 (discus-
sion of the right of establishment in EFTA). For further discussion, see infra note 125.
122. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE 1984 RE-
VIEW OF THE 1976 DECLARATION AND DECISIONS 24 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 REVIEW] (citing
the Codes, the principle of National Treatment, and Investment Incentives and Disincentives as
the OECD instruments on international investment).
123. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, DECLARATION
BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES AND DECISIONS OF THE OECD
COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (rev. ed.
1984) [hereinafter DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES].
124. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CODE OF LIBER-
ALISATION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS (1986) [hereinafter CAPITAL MOVEMENTS CODE].
125. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CODE OF LIBER-
ALISATION OF CURRENT INVISIBLE OPERATIONS (1986) [hereinafter INVISIBLES CODE]. See
also J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 11, at 1035; Schott, Protectionist Threat to Trade and
Investment in Services, 6 WORLD EON. 195, 212 (1983). In addition, both the Treaty of Rome
and the Stockholm Convention contain provisions related to national investment controls. See
supra note 121. While these agreements are multilateral, customs union and free trade agree-
ments pose unique issues in trade and will not be addressed here.
126. INTRODUCTION TO THE OECD CODES, supra note 3, at 12. See DECLARATION ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 123, at 11-13
(using non-imperative language).
Investment in the GATT
1. OECD Declaration on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises
The Declaration consists of four instruments: Guidelines for Mul-
tinational Enterprises, National Treatment, International Investment
Incentives and Disincentives, and Consultation Procedures. 127 The
National Treatment and International Investment Incentives and Dis-
incentives instruments cover investment.
The National Treatment instrument is a short, four paragraph doc-
ument which states that Member countries "should" accord national
treatment under their laws, regulations, and administrative practices
to the foreign-controlled enterprises of other Members operating in
their territories. 128  Members need only "consider" applying such
treatment to the enterprises of non-Members, and need only "endeav-
our to ensure" that their territorial subdivisions apply national treat-
ment.1 29 New or expanded investment by already established foreign-
controlled enterprises (e.g., investment by an established subsidiary of
a foreign company) is covered, regardless of the relationship of the
new/expanded investment to the economic sector of the existing in-
vestment. 130  However, new investments, so-called "green field" in-
vestments, by non-resident enterprises 13 1 are not covered by the
National Treatment principles; 132 they are instead dealt with by the
Capital Movements Code.
The National Treatment instrument thus introduces a qualified na-
tional treatment principle: national treatment is accorded to estab-
lished investment with respect to further investment, but need not be
given to enterprises not yet established within the territorial bounds of
127. DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISES, supra note 123, at 11-13.
128. Id. at 12 ("Foreign-Controlled Enterprise" refers to an enterprise that is owned or
controlled, directly or indirectly, by nationals of another Member country).
129. Id.
130. 1984 REVIEW, supra note 122, at 42-43. Thus a foreign-controlled computer manufac-
turing (goods) concern in a Member country would be accorded national treatment in the estab-
lishment of a consulting (services) subsidiary.
131. Distinguishing "residence" from "nationality," the Committee on Capital Movements
and Invisibles Trade (CMIT) offers a description of "resident" including the following:
As a rule, individuals living permanently in a country and enterprises located in that coun-
try are considered by the authorities to be residents. Branches and subsidiaries of enter-
prises, including those owned or controlled by non-residents or foreigners, are normally
considered to be residents of the country in which they operate.
INTRODUCTION TO THE OECD CODES, supra note 3, at 30 n.7.
132. The National Treatment instrument provides that "[t]he Declaration expressly does not
deal with the right of Member countries to regulate the entry of foreign investment or the condi-
tions of establishment of foreign enterprises." DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL INVEST-
MENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 123, at 12.
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a Member. 133 This is a less liberal guarantee than that contained in
the FCNs and BITs which do not distinguish national treatment rights
based on the location of an investor with respect to a party, but it is
conceptually similar to the border orientation of the national treat-
ment provisions in the GATT. 3 4
Otherwise inconsistent measures may be taken under the instru-
ment to maintain public order, to protect essential security interests,
or to fulfill peace and security obligations. Under a Decision of the
Council on National Treatment, each Member Country must notify
the OECD of measures taken by it that constitute exceptions to na-
tional treatment.' 3 5 Thus the Declaration emphasizes transparency
and may, despite its non-binding character, achieve the attendant pres-
sure to conform that public exposure of discriminatory practices often
brings.
The International Investment Incentives and Disincentives instru-
ment136 is shorter still. In its three paragraphs, OECD Members rec-
ognize the need to strengthen their cooperation in the field of
international direct investment; recognize the need to give "due
weight" to the interests of other Members affected by measures pro-
viding official incentives and disincentives to investment; and agree to
endeavor to make such measures as transparent as possible. In a re-
lated Decision, the Council on International Investment Incentives
and Disincentives has provided a forum for any Member Country
which considers that "its interests may be adversely affected by the
impact on its flow of international direct investments" due to the "sig-
133. See infra notes 139-53 and accompanying text describing the Capital Movements Code
which covers investment by enterprises not already established in the host country.
134. GATT article III contains the national treatment obligation which applies to the "prod-
ucts of the territory of any Contracting Party imported into the territory of any other Con-
tracting Party" but does not apply to products not yet imported. GATT, supra note 1, art.
111(4). For a recent example of the consequences of this distinction, see United States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel, Majority View, Lobsters from Canada, Final Report of
the Panel, USA 89-1807-01, May 21, 1990 (When quantitative restrictions otherwise prohibited
under article XI are applied to both domestic and foreign products, the restrictions are consid-
ered internal measures, not restrictions on importation under article XI, and are subject to the
arguably more forgiving article III national treatment standard). Cf ORGANISATION FOR ECO-
NOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, NATIONAL TREATMENT FOR FOREIGN-CON-
TROLLED ENTERPRISES 54, n.3 (1985) [hereinafter NATIONAL TREATMENT FOR FOREIGN-
CONTROLLED ENTERPRISES] ("IT]he GATT principle of National Treatment refers to non-dis-
crimination between products of local and foreign origin, while the OECD principle of National
Treatment refers to non-discrimination between domestic and foreign-owned or -controlled en-
terprises operating in the country in question.").
135. .e., those which do not relate to public order, security, etc. Second Revised Decision of
the Council on National Treatment, in DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 123, at 31.
136. DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISES, supra note 123, art. 11I.
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nificant official incentives and disincentives to international direct in-
vestment" provided by another Member. 37
Incentives and disincentives are not defined by the International
Investment Incentives and Disincentives instrument. In a survey of
the investment incentive policies of Member Countries, the following
broad definition was used: "[A]n incentive (or disincentive) will be
understood as any government measure designed to influence an in-
vestment decision, and increasing (or reducing) the profit accruing to
the potential investment or altering the risks attaching to it."' 3
2. The OECD Codes of Liberalization
The OECD Capital Movements Code139 and Invisibles Code' 40
"complement and reinforce" the GATTr and the IMF in the promo-
tion of a liberal international economic environment.' 41 "The ultimate
objective [of the Codes], broadly speaking, is that residents of different
Member countries should be as free to transact business with each
other as are residents of a single country."'' 42 These two Codes, both
adopted in 1961, have the same binding legal status on OECD mem-
bers as OECD Decisions. 43 The Code obligations apply only to na-
tional controls affecting operations between the residents of OECD
Member countries adhering to the Codes and to new investment by
nonresidents. The Codes do not cover operations between either non-
residents or the residents of a single Member. Here, the National
Treatment instrument of the Declaration might apply.'"
The Capital Movements Code covers most of the common forms of
medium- and long-term operations, and by a 1989 amendment, many
short-term capital movements, as well.' 45 Members are required to
"progressively abolish ... restrictions on movements of capital to the
extent necessary for effective economic co-operation.' 46 In particu-
lar, Members are to endeavor to "treat all non-resident-owned assets
137. Second Revised Decision of the Council on International Investment Incentives and Disin-
centives, in id. at 33.
138. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND DISINCEN-
TIVES AND THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PROCESS 10 (1983).
139. CAPITAL MOVEMENTS CODE, supra note 124.
140. INVISIBLES CODE, supra note 125.
141. INTRODUCTION TO THE OECD CODES, supra note 3, at 10-11.
142. Id. at 12.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 13.
145. Ley, Liberating Capital Movements, OECD OBSERVER, Aug. 1989, at 22.
146. CAPITAL MOVEMENTS CODE, supra note 124, art. 1.
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in the same way," to "permit the liquidation of all non-resident-owned
assets and the transfer of such assets or of their liquidation proceeds,"
and to "avoid... exchange restrictions on the movement of capital or
the use of non-resident-owned funds."'147 The Code applies to a wide
range of both foreign direct investment and portfolio investment.
The Code covers direct investment in a Member Country by non-
residents or abroad by a Member's residents; a Member is required to
grant "any authorization required" for the creation or extension of an
enterprise, for participation in a new or existing enterprise, or for a
long-term loan. 148
In this respect, the Capital Movements Code complements the Na-
tional Treatment instrument. The Code covers investment by nonresi-
dents while the National Treatment instrument covers investment by
"foreign controlled enterprises" already established in Member coun-
tries. 149 So, for example, a first-time creation of a subsidiary by a firm
of one Member in the territory of another would be covered by the
Capital Movements Code while both the operations of the subsidiary
established and any further investments by it would be covered by the
National Treatment instrument. Where a branch is established by a
nonresident parent, the Capital Movements Code would also apply.
However, it is unclear under the agreements whether further invest-
ments by such a branch should be attributed to the foreign parent and
covered by the Code or should be considered an act of a resident and
covered by the National Treatment instrument. 150 The Captial Move-
ments Code prohibits discriminatory investment controls on inward
direct investment.151 However, all Members have taken a reservation
for inward direct investment and establishment in certain sectors, 152
and many maintain reciprocity requirements. 15 3
The Invisibles Code requires Members to eliminate all restrictions
147. Id.
148. Id., art. 2(a), at 12.
149. NATIONAL TREATMENT FOR FOREIGN-CONTROLLED ENTERPRISES, supra note 134, at
27-28.
150. See 1984 REVIEW, supra note 122, at 42-43; NATIONAL TREATMENT FOR FOREIGN-
CONTROLLED ENTERPRISES, supra note 134, at 27-28.
151. The authorities of Members shall not maintain or introduce:
Regulations or practices applying to the granting of licenses, concessions, or similar
authorisations, including conditions or requirements attaching to such authorisations and
affecting the operations of enterprises, that raise special barriers or limitiations with respect
to non-resident (as compared to resident) investors, and that have the intent or the effect of
preventing or significantly impeding inward direct investment by non-residents.
CAPITAL MOVEMENTS CODE, supra note note 124, at 26, annex A.
152. Id., annex B.
153. See infra note 169 on reciprocity.
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on specified current invisible operations of other Members. 154 Cov-
ered operations are listed in an annex under the headings: business
and industry, foreign trade, transport, insurance, films, income from
capital, travel and tourism, personal income and expenditure, public
income and expenditure, and "general" which includes advertising,
professional services, and the registration of patents and trade-
marks. 55 Countries maintain reservations to these obligations princi-
pally for insurance, films, and air, land, and sea transport. 56 The
United States has made reservations for maritime freight, inland wa-
terway.freight, road transport, and printed films and other record-
ings.' 57 The United States and Canada have also been granted
exceptions for acts taken by their states and provinces. 58
The OECD has attempted to strengthen the Invisibles Code with a
series of sectoral agreements added to the annex of the Code. Three
amendments have been made to provide detailed treatment of insur-
ance, tourism, and audiovisual works, and a fourth on banking and
financial services will go into effect this year.' 59 These agreements
overlap the Capital Movements Code and, potentially, the National
Treatment instrument. The insurance agreement, for example, not
only details the types of insurance covered (goods, life, reinsurance,
etc.) but also attempts to discipline the use of financial and prudential
requirements on the insurer and on the insurer's investments and de-
posits. With respect to establishment, the agreement provides freedom
of choice to the investor regarding form: subsidiary, branch, or
agency. 6' For establishment by a branch or agency, "[a]ll statutory
and administrative controls of insurance shall ensure equivalent treat-
ment for national insurers and insurers from other Member States so
that the latter shall not be liable to heavier burdens than those im-
posed on national insurers.' 161 The insurance agreement also ensures
national treatment for establishment authorizations to branches or
154. "Members shall eliminate between one another ...restrictions on current invisible
transactions and transfers .. " INVISIBLES CODE, supra note 125, art l(a). "Members shall
grant any authorisation required for a current invisible operation specified [in the annex]." Id.,
art. 2(a).
155. Id. at 25-31, annex A.
156. INTRODUCTION TO THE OECD CODES, supra note 3, at 16.
157. INVISIBLES CODE, supra note 125, at 85-86, annex B.
158. Decision of the Council Regarding the Application of the Provisions of the Code of Liber-
alisation of Current Invisibles Operations to Action Taken by States of the United States, in IN-
VISIBLES CODE, supro note 125, at 95-96, annex C. Decision of the Council Regarding the
Application of the Provisions of the Code of Liberalisation of Current Invisibles Operations to Ac-
tion Taken by the Provinces of Canada, in id. at 99, annex D.
159. Ley, supra note 145, at 22.
160. INVISIBLES CODE, supra note 125, at 39-40, part III of annex I to annex A.
161. Id. at 39, part III.
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agencies 162 and provides security for transfers. For direct operations,
it reiterates the Invisibles Code guarantee of the freedom to transfer
profits., 63
From the standpoint of national investment controls, the Invisibles
Code and its annexes provide protection to investors in two fundamen-
tal ways: directly to some service providers, and indirectly to all in-
vestors. Protection is extended directly to service industry investors
by generally prohibiting restrictions on their branch or agency opera-
tions and financial transfers and, at least in some cases, on the estab-
lishment of subsidiaries (e.g., insurance). The second protection
extends indirectly to all investors who depend on free access to these
covered services in order to establish or operate their investments. En-
try restrictions on professional service people is a control governments
apply to investments. 164 By granting cross-border freedoms to serv-
ices, however, the Invisibles Code effectively limits the ability of
OECD members to restrict an investor's use of such essential nonresi-
dent services as accountants, consultants, engineers, lawyers, etc.
Similarily, freedoms granted to financial services could conceivably
operate to limit the financial restrictions governments apply to manu-
facturing investments.
Under both Codes, many avenues exist for those who would avoid
their obligations. In addition to the right to reserve against specific
obligations, 165 members may take otherwise Code-inconsistent meas-
ures in order to maintain public order, health, morals, or safety as well
as for "essential security interests," and to fulfill international peace
and security obligations.' 66 Exceptions to the nondiscrimination prin-
ciple are allowed for participants in special customs or monetary sys-
tems 167 and a member is also permitted to derogate from either Code if
"its economic and financial situation justifies such a course" or for
balance of payments reasons.' 6 Significantly, the Capital Movements
Code does not apply to acts by states of the United States, nor does the
Invisibles Code apply to acts of the sub-governments of either the
162. Id.
163. Id. at 45, part IV.
164. See supra text at Section II(B) for a discussion of personnel entry restrictions and the
five types of national investment controls.
165. INVISIBLES CODE, supra note 125, art. 2; CAPITAL MOVEMENTS CODE, supra note 124,
art. 2.
166. INVISIBLES CODE, supra note 125, arts. 2, 3; CAPITAL MOVEMENTS CODE, supra note
124, arts. 2, 3.
167. INVISIBLES CODE, supra note 125, art. 10; CAPITAL MOVEMENTS CODE, supra note
124, art. 10.
168. INVISIBLES CODE, supra note 125, art. 7; CAPITAL MOVEMENTS CODE, supra note 124,
art. 7.
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United States or Canada. 169 Finally, in recognition of the practice of
many members to require reciprocity before according national treat-
ment to inward investment, an annex was added to the Capital Move-
ments Code in order to treat such requirements separately from
measures that are reserved under article 2.170
As compared to the GATT, the dispute settlement mechanism of
the Codes is weak. The Codes provide no right of retaliation or other
means of positive enforcement, but instead seek compliance through a
system of notification, examination, and consultation. A committee
on Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions (CMIT) is the over-
sight committee for the Codes and conducts periodic examinations of
members' reservations and derogations. 171 For those seeking redress
against a member for improperly invoking a derogation or for frustrat-
ing or violating its liberalization commitments, there exists only a
right to notify the Organisation, and in the case of an improper dero-
gation, to have the situation examined by a "special Ministerial
Group." 172 The CMIT considers these complaints, but the Codes pro-
vide neither "carrot" nor "stick" to ensure compliance.
Taken together, the Declaration and the Codes form a framework
covering most of the five national controls on investment. For estab-
lishment restrictions, the National Treatment instrument protects resi-
dent investors while the Capital Movements Code prohibits these
restrictions when applied to nonresidents. The sector-specific annexes
of the Invisibles Code partially overlap these guarantees with their
own limits on establishment restrictions. Operating requirements
placed on enterprises operating in another member are covered by the
169. Decision of the Council Regarding the Application of the Code of Liberalisation of Capital
Movements to Action Taken by the States of the United States, in CAPITAL MOVEMENTS CODE,
supra note 124, at 107-08, annex C. Decisions of the Council, supra note 158, annex C and annex
D.
170. Decision of the Council Regarding Measures and Practices Concerning Reciprocity and!
or Involving Discrimination Among Investors Originating in Various OECD Member Countries in
the Area of Inward Direct Investment and Establishment, in CAPITAL MOVEMENTS CODE, supra
note 124, at 117-22, annex E. Members are required to notify the OECD of their reciprocity
requirements. Apparently members do not have to make the same reservations for reciprocity
requirements (which are given a "different status") as they would for other discriminatory rules,
though the review procedures for both are essentially the same. See INTRODUCTION TO THE
OECD CODES, supra note 3, at 13-14. Empirically, the reciprocity notifications have all related
to services industries, primarily banking and financial services, but also to insurance, airlines, and
tourism. CAPITAL MOVEMENTS CODE, supra note 124, at annex E. According to U.S. Deputy
Assistant Treasury Secretary Newman, the number of members with reciprocity requirements is
growing, and at least eighteen of the twenty-four members will have such powers by 1993. U.S.
Proposal on Foreign Banks Unwarranted-La Ware, Reuters, April 24, 1991 (outlining debate in
United States over proposals to require reciprocity for foreign banks).
171. INTRODUCTION TO THE OECD CODES, supra note 3, at 12.
172. INVISIBLES CODE, supra note 125, arts. 13, 15-17; CAPITAL MOVEMENTS CODE, supra
note 124, arts. 13, 15-17.
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National Treatment instrument and, for certain sectors, by the In-
visibles Code annexes. Operating requirements in the form of incen-
tives and disincentives are discouraged under the International
Investment Incentives and Disincentives instrument. Personnel entry
restrictions are subject to the national treatment instrument and are
also indirectly limited with respect to those services covered by the
Invisibles Code. The framework similarly subjects financial restric-
tions to national treatment and further liberalizes financial transfers in
the Capital Movements Code and in the Invisibles Code and its 1989
amendment. Expropriation is not expressly treated within the
framework.
The weaknesses of the framework are apparent. The National
Treatment and International Investment Incentives and Disincentives
instruments are nonbinding, and the Codes lack a credible dispute set-
tlement mechanism. Recent efforts to elevate the National Treatment
instrument to legally binding status have failed. In what bodes poorly
for any significant advances on investment in the more heterogeneous
GATT, Ministers at the June 1991 OECD Ministerial Meeting not
only failed to agree to a legally binding commitment to apply the Na-
tional Treatment instrument, but also failed even to agree to a non-
binding, but symbolic, "political" commitment to do so. 173 Further,
the language of the framework instruments is vague, and in terms of
their marginal contribution to the discipline of national investment
controls, all three instruments are limited in application to only the
twenty-four Members, developed countries with generally liberal in-
vestment regimes. The lack of strong enforcement procedures should
not be over-emphasized, however. More than one commentator on
international practice has recognized a value in the simple articulation
of standards, regardless of their character. 174 Finally, the framework
allows Members numerous avenues of escape from obligations. Much
of the criticism of the framework has centered on the ease of deroga-
tions. 175 However, the OECD reports that such exceptions are few
173. Telephone Interview with James Heg, USOECD, Paris, June 21, 1991. This effort foun-
dered on the same issues as a year earlier: European objection, particularly French, to a qualified
commitment by members with federal systems to bind their subordinate governments, and U.S.
objections to Canada's desire for a "cultural identity" exception. Id. Cf OECD Countries Unable
to Reach Agreement on Guidelines Covering National Treatment, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
808 (June 6, 1990). See also Text. Final Communique of the Organisation for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development Ministerial Meeting, released in Paris June 5, 8 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
913, 917 (June 12, 1991).
174. See, e.g., J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note II, at 862. With respect to exchange
restrictions, the authors note that, despite the broad exceptions to Code obligations, the subject-
ing of national restrictions to international scrutiny on a regular basis has probably played an
important role in recent liberalizations.
175. See, e.g., id.
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and declining and that they are also less widespread as a matter of
practice than the lists of reservations would imply. 176 In this environ-
ment of bilateral agreements and limited multilateral discipline, con-
cerned countries have turned their attention to the GATT as a forum
for discussing the regulation of national investment controls.
IV. INVESTMENT IN THE GATT
In terms of the five classes of national investment controls, the
GATT provides little coverage. It grants no rights or obligations with
respect to establishment. If such rights are to be found anywhere, they
must be derived from general principles of nondiscrimination found
scattered throughout the document. As to the operation of enter-
prises, protection against discriminatory treatment is only derivative
of obligations undertaken not to discriminate against the products of
another. Article XV of the GATT calls upon the Contracting Parties
not to frustrate the intent of the agreement by exchange action. 77 No
provision is made in the GATT for personnel entry restrictions or for
the conduct of parties in the case of expropriation.
A. History of Investment in the GATT
The GATT has its origins in a proposal by the United States for
the establishment within the United Nations of an International Trade
Organization (ITO). The United States tabled its proposal as a means
to expand world trade and employment and "to promote the solution
of problems in the field of international commercial policies and rela-
tions." 178 The scope of the proposed ITO Charter was broad, includ-
ing provisions for the discipline and promotion of employment,
commercial policy (including trade restrictive measures), restrictive
business practices, and intergovernmental commodity arrangements.
In its original submission, however, the United States did not propose
any rules for the treatment of investment.
In the view of the United States, it was both unnecessary and dan-
gerous to negotiate investment in a multilateral framework. 79 FCNs
already provided for investment security, and the threat that multilat-
176. INTRODUCTION TO THE OECD CODES, supra note 3, at 14-19.
177. GATT, supra note i, art. XV(4). This article gives recourse to the IMF for those expe-
riencing exchange restrictions on transfers in connection with imports. As a matter of practice,
the GATT has been incapable of distinguishing trade effects from exchange effects, and has con-
sequently deferred to IMF jurisdiction on the few occasions these issues have arisen. See GATT
Analytical Index, art. XV(6)-XV(8), GATT Doc. Leg/2 (1989).
178. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SUGGESTED CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS art. I (Commercial Policy Series No. 93, Sept. 1946).
179. C. WILCOx, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 146 (1949).
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eral negotiation of investment rules would result in a lowest common
denominator of acceptable discipline discouraged the United States
from attempting to include investment in the ITO. 80 Nevertheless, at
the London Conference, fearful of the excessiveness of calls by less-
developed countries (LDCs), notably Colombia, for greater attention
to their economic development needs, the United States broached the
subject of investor rights as a counterweight to these claims.18'
At the London Conference, an entire chapter was added to the
Charter to account for "economic development." Under this chapter,
members agreed to "impose no unreasonable impediments that would
prevent other members from obtaining access to facilities required for
their economic development."'' 8 2 A concomitant to this prodevelop-
ment provision was included for investors. Under it, members agreed
to "take no unreasonable action injurious to the interests of ... other
Members, business entities or persons." 83 This was the first introduc-
tion of rights for enterprises into the GATT/ITO framework.
Subsequently, at the Geneva Conference, the United States tabled
amendments espousing three principles for investment: (1) national
treatment, except where a country has given advance notice of the
treatment to be accorded; (2) unqualified most-favored-nation treat-
ment; and (3) effective, adequate, and prompt compensation in the
event of expropriation. 4 The U.S. proposals sparked an extended de-
bate which carried over to the Final Conference at Havana.
In the Havana Charter, members recognized that "international
investment, both public and private, can be of great value in promot-
ing economic development and reconstruction, and consequent social
progress."' 85 However, the interests of developing countries not only
dominated the provisions on investment, but did so in a manner con-
trary to the interests of the United States, the United Kingdom, and
other capital-exporting nations.
Under article 12 of the Charter, a member was permitted to "take
any appropriate safeguards necessary to ensure that foreign invest-
ment [was] not used as a basis for interference in its internal affairs or
180. Id.
181. Id. at 143-48.
182. Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Employment, art. 12, para. 2, at 28, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/33 (Oct. 1946)
[hereinafter London Charter].
183. Id., art. 12, para. 4.
184. W. BROWN, JR., THE UNITED STATES AND THE RESTORATION OF WORLD TRADE 102
(1950).
185. United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Final Act and Related Docu-
ments, art. 12, para. l(a), U.N. Doc. E/Conf.2/78 (1948) [hereinafter Havana Charter].
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national policies."' 8 6 Further, a member was granted the right to de-
termine the terms upon which it would allow future foreign invest-
ment, if at all; to "prescribe and give effect on just terms to
requirements as to the ownership of existing and future investments";
and to provide other reasonable requirements with respect to existing
and future investments.18 7
Subject to the above provisions for economic development, mem-
bers undertook two obligations to foster investment: "to provide rea-
sonable opportunities for investments acceptable to them and adequate
security for existing and future investments, ... and to give due regard
to the desirability of avoiding discrimination as between foreign invest-
ments."' 18 8 This obligation is obviously replete with words subject to
interpretation such as "reasonable, .... acceptable," "adequate," and
"due regard." One commentator considered this rule to fall "consid-
erably short of the minimum standard of international customary law
on the protection of foreign property."' 189
In article 11, a second, broader commitment was undertaken by
each member not to "take unreasonable or unjustifiable action within
its territory injurious to the rights or interests of nationals of other
members in the enterprise, skills, capital, arts or technology which
they have supplied."' 90 Finally, for those who viewed their rights
under the ITO to have been nullified or impaired, recourse was avail-
able to the dispute settlement provisions, chapter VIII of the Havana
Charter. '91
The framework countenanced by the ITO for regulating measures
applied to investment was rooted in a recognition of the importance of
investment to economic development. It has also been asserted that
these provisions represented an attempt to use both procedural and
substantive rules to stem a decline in arbitration disciplines in the
post-war period. 192 The U.S. Congress never accepted the Charter, in
part because of the dissatisfaction of the U.S. Senate with the invest-
ment provisions. 93 This sounded the death knell for both the ITO
and multilateral investment discipline in a GATT/ITO context. 94
186. Id., art. 12, para. 1 (c).
187. Id.
188. Id., art. 12, para. 2(a).
189. G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, supra note 54, at 136.
190. Havana Charter, supra note 185, art. 11, para. 1(b).
191. C. WILCOX, supra note 178, at 147-48.
192. G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, supra note 54, at 136.
193. McCulloch & Owen, supra note 46, at 350.
194. See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 50-51 (1969).
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Compared to the ITO Charter, the GATT is a narrow document.
It was created as an interim trade agreement to allow tariff reduction
negotiations to proceed while the more inclusive, more time consum-
ing ITO was being negotiated.1 95 Accordingly, the GATT refers only
to rights and benefits accorded to products and incorporates primarily
the commercial policy provisions of the Havana Charter. There are
no substantive references to investment, to services, or to the enter-
prises of Contracting Parties.
This is not to say, however, that GATT investment discussions are
entirely novel. In 1955, the Contracting Parties adopted a seldom-
discussed Resolution on International Investment for Economic De-
velopment in which they recommended that
the contracting parties who are in a position to provide capital for inter-
national investment and the contracting parties who desire to obtain
such capital use their best endeavors to create conditions calculated to
stimulate the international flow of capital having regard in particular to
the importance for this purpose of providing by appropriate methods for
security for existing and future investment, the avoidance of double taxa-
tion, and facilities for the transfer of earnings upon foreign
investments[.] 196
The Resolution further urged parties to enter into bilateral and
multilateral agreements relating to these matters.1 97 Thus, at a time
when the object of the ITO was still fresh in the minds of the Con-
tracting Parties and the nature of the GATT as a tariff agreement was
most apparent, the parties appear to have had no difficulty discussing
investment in the context of the GATT. By this time it was apparent
that there would be no ITO. 198 It may be that the spark of enlighten-
ment that had originally forged the multilateral trade negotiations had
not yet faded into self-interested literalism. In any case, little has been
made of those discussions and today we face the question again.
B. Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)
It is apparent from the preceding section that the GATT, as origi-
nally intended, was not designed to do much more than to secure the
reduction of tariffs through multilateral negotiations. At the same
time, however, the GATT can be fairly said to occupy the field of
195. W. BROWN, JR., supra note 184, at 61-62.
196. CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED Docu-
MENTS Supp. No. 3, at 49-50 (1955) (International Investment for Economic Development, Res-
olution of Mar. 4, 1955).
197. Id. at 50.
198. For all practical purposes, the ITO died in 1950. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note
11, at 295.
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binding multilateral agreements for economic liberalization. The
GATT context helps to illuminate the two views presented in this arti-
cle, literalist and functionalist. Countries seeking to limit the scope of
existing GATT obligations or the expansion of GATT subject matter
jurisdiction assert the literalist view that the GATT is a wheel of obli-
gations with products at its hub. For these countries, the addition of
any spoke of obligations must show a relation to traded products.
The functionalists, however, maintain that the GATT is a forum
for the liberalization of economic relations. While the effect of public
or private sector acts on trade in goods may be a useful benchmark for
assessing discriminatory treatment and injury, such effect does not suf-
fice to capture the universe of undesirable barriers to liberalization.
For functionalists, barriers to investment are themselves potential in-
hibitions to economic development and consequently fall within the
purview of the GATT.
In the Uruguay Round, the tension between literalism and func-
tionalism and its effect on the conduct of negotiations is nowhere more
apparent than in the TRIMs talks. Functionalists wish to cast these
talks as the discussion of investment in the GATT. The U.S. Con-
gress, in fact, listed "foreign direct investment" and not TRIMs as its
investment-related concern in the Uruguay Round.199 Literalists re-
ject such a broad discussion of investment in a GATT context.
1. Background
The United States has long sought to expand the purview of the
GATT to regulate national controls on foreign investors. The impetus
for TRIMs negotiations came ten years ago at a meeting of the Con-
sultative Group of 18 when the United States requested the Secretariat
to compile an inventory of investment measures, especially perform-
ance requirements.2°° The United States asked for the inventory in
order to explore the findings of a recent study of the Joint Develop-
ment Committee of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and the IMF that concluded that performance require-
ments on MNEs could have trade-distortive effects. 20' Over the next
several years, the United States raised the issue a number of times.
In 1982 the GATT Ministers declined to include the subject in
199. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § I 101(b)(1 1),
102 Stat. 1107, 1124 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(11) (1991)).
200. E. Graham & P. Krugman, Trade-Related Investment Measures, in COMPLETING THE
URUGUAY ROUND 147, 150 (J. Schott ed. 1990).
201. Id.
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their Ministerial Work Programme, 20 2 and in 1985 participants at the
Senior Officials' Group Meeting again disagreed over the link between
trade flows and investment policies. 20 3 Finally, in a "last minute com-
promise" at the Punta del Este meeting launching the Uruguay
Round, the Contracting Parties agreed to include TRIMs among the
"New Subjects" for negotiation.2°4
The Ministerial Declaration launching the Round provided that
"[following an examination of the operation of GATT articles related
to the trade restrictive and distorting effects of investment measures,
negotiations should elaborate, as appropriate, further provisions that
may be necessary to avoid such adverse effects on trade. '205
The language of the Declaration is no clarion call to negotiate in-
vestment, but rather limits its mandate to an examination of invest-
ment measures with "adverse effects on trade." An early note by the
GATT Secretariat underscored the limited mandate of the TRIMs ne-
gotiating group. It declared that the language of the Punta del Este
Declaration on Trade-Related Investment Measures represented a de-
cision to focus on the direct trade effects of investment measures and
the extent to which they are addressed by GATT articles, rather than
on the broad relationship between investment, production, and
trade.206 Thus, while the United States had hoped to include discus-
sions on investment in the GATT, it got something far less.
At the 1989 Mid-Term Review of the Uruguay Round Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, the GATT ministers charged the TRIMs Negoti-
ating Group with identifying those "trade-restrictive and distorting"
effects of investment measures which are covered by existing GATT
articles and those for which adequate provision has not been made.
The mandate instructed the Negotiating Group to consider the devel-
opment needs of countries, the need for new GATT provisions, and
such other issues as the modalities of implementation. 20 7
202. Id. at 6.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Press Communique, GATT/1396, at 9 (Sept. 25, 1986) [hereinafter Ministerial
Declaration].
206. See Submission by Government of India to the GATT Negotiating Group on Trade-Re-
lated Investment Measures I (Sept. 11, 1988) [hereinafter Indian Submission] (available from the
Indian Embassy, Washington, D.C.). The Indian Submission refers to GATT document
MTN.GNG/NG 12/W/3.
207. Mid-term Review: Final Agreement at Geneva, 61 Focus: GATT NEWSLETrER 1, 8-9
(1989) [hereinafter Mid-term Review].
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2. What Are TRIMs?
There is no adequate definition of a "TRIM. ' ' 208 The concept is a
creation of those wishing to rationalize the discussion of investment
without broadening the context of an agreement on tariffs and trade.
As broadly conceived, a TRIM is any requirement which affects trade
applied by a government as a condition to the making or operation of
an investment. Generally, TRIMs are of four types: those restricting
imports, those restricting exports, those requiring exports, and those
which, by their terms, do not explicitly direct trade decisions.
Within the model of national investment controls, 2°9 TRIMs im-
plicate establishment restrictions (e.g., conditioning market access on
a grant by the investor of a certain percentage of equity to nationals of
the host country); operating restrictions (e.g., requiring an investor to
purchase domestic products); personnel entry restrictions (e.g., requir-
ing a company to utilize local management); and financial restrictions
(e.g., limiting an enterprise's access to foreign exchange).
The United States and European Community have suggested the
following thirteen measures for coverage by a TRIMs agreement. 210
Because these countries are the strongest proponents of including in-
vestment in the GATT, this list arguably represents a very broad inter-
pretation of what might constitute a TRIM.
IMPORT RESTRICTIONS
1. Local Content Requirements require the investor to purchase
or to use inputs from local sources (including itself) in some abso-
lute amount or percentage of production value or quantity.
2. Domestic Manufacturing Requirements oblige an investor to
manufacture some percentage or fixed amount of production or
inputs in the host country.
3. Trade Balancing Requirements restrict an investor from im-
porting or from using imported products to an amount corre-
sponding in some way to the amount of its exports.
4. Exchange Restrictions limit an investor's access to foreign ex-
change generally or to that earned from exports.
208. See Secretariat Note, supra note 17, at 4, for a discussion of the controversy regarding
the definition of a TRIM. TRIMs are sometimes also referred to as trade-related performance
requirements, though these may also be a subcategory of TRIMs. See Fontheim & Gadbaw,
Trade-Related Performance Requirements under the GATT-MTN System and U.S. Law, 14 LAW
& POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 129 (1982).
209. See supra text at section II.B for a discussion of the five types of investment controls.
210. See, e.g., Hayes, Foreign Direct Investment: Will the Uruguay Round Make a Differ-
ence?, 25 ROYAL INST. OF INT'L AFF. DiscUSSION PAPERS 3-4 (1990) (list of TRIMs); Secreta-
riat Note, supra note 17, at 4.
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EXPORT RESTRICTIONS
5. Domestic Sales Requirements require the sale of a certain per-
centage of output or a minimum quantity or value of production
on the host country market.
EXPORT REQUIREMENTS
6. Export Performance Requirements oblige an investor to ex-
port a specified percentage or amount of production quantity or
value.
7. Product Mandating requires an investor to grant the invest-
ment exclusive rights to specified export markets, or requires the
investor to export to certain foreign markets or regions.
NON-TRADE SPECIFIC TRIMS
8. Technology Transfer Requirements require an investor to in-
clude specified technology in its production process or to conduct
some minimum level of research and development in the host
country.
9. Local Equity Requirements require that local investors hold
or control a certain minimum percentage of the equity in an
investment.
10. Licensing Requirements oblige an investor to license the pro-
duction, use, or sale of some product or technology to domestic
companies.
11. Manufacturing Restrictions prevent an investor from manu-
facturing certain products.
12. Remittance Restrictions limit an investor's transfer of prof-
its, earnings, or capital to the home country.
13. Incentives induce investment or acceptance of other TRIMs
by the offer of some benefit or advantage to the investor.
3. Incidence of TRIMs
The data on the incidence of TRIMs are limited.211 However, it is
clear that TRIMS are most often employed by developing countries
and are usually imposed as investment disincentives, balanced by in-
vestment, trade protection, and other incentives in a package of terms
designed to effect the economic or political objectives of the host coun-
try.2 1 2 TRIMs vary by sector but are generally most often applied to
211. Secretariat Note, supra note 17, at 2 (stating that with respect to TRIMS "It]here is
little empirical analysis to draw on since detailed and comparable information covering a signifi-
cant sample of investment projects does not exist."). Governments do not like international
public scrutiny of their domestic policy tools, and investors subject to TRIMs do not wish to
antagonize their host governments. Fontheim & Gadbaw, supra note 208, at 131-32,
212. Secretariat Note, supra note 17, at 6; Hayes, supra note 210, at 5. See also Schwarz &
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the automobile, mining, electrical machinery manufacturing, and
equipment sectors.213
Developing countries are not alone in the use of TRIMs-many
OECD Member countries also resort to their use. Local content re-
quirements are the most common TRIM for these countries. Aus-
tralia, for example, applies this TRIM for automobiles, tobacco, and
minerals processing and Norway, for oil and gas operations.214 Aus-
tralia, Japan, Austria, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States are
among countries which utilize local equity requirements or require-
ments related to research and development.21 5 OECD countries im-
pose TRIMs in order to effect three primary objectives: to promote
general economic goals (employment, balance of payments, etc.), to
insure that enterprises meet the objectives of government-sponsored
incentive programs, and to counter the restrictive intrafirm practices
of enterprises (RBPs).216
Developing countries, in declining order of frequency, principally
utilize TRIMs in the form of requirements: on local content, local
equity, export performance, and technology transfer.21 7 Roughly two-
thirds of these TRIMs are applied to all investments while the remain-
ing sector-specific requirements are applied largely to the automobile
industry and to the computer, informatics, and telecommunications
sectors.218 The sector-specific requirements are principally local con-
tent rules and are most commonly found in Venezuela, Mexico, and
Brazil.219
Among less developed regions, Latin America appears to impose
the greatest number of TRIMs, especially Venezuela and Mexico, but
also Colombia, Brazil, and Ecuador. The next most frequent user is
Asia, particularly the Phillippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and India. Fi-
nally, among African states, only such countries as Egypt, Ghana, and
Nigeria impose more than a few TRIMs. 220
Figures vary on the degree to which foreign affiliates experience
TRIMs. The most is known about the foreign affiliates of U.S. corpo-
Caplan, Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs): Scrutiny in the GATT and Implications
for Socialist Countries, 11 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 55, 58 (1987).
213. Schwarz & Caplan, supra note 212, at 59-60. The automobile sector is subject to expan-
sive TRIM protection. Id.
214. Hayes, supra note 210, at 5.
215. Id.
216. 1984 REVIEW, supra note 122, at 51.
217. Hayes, supra note 210, at 5.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 5, 6.
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rations, and even these figures are suspect. A 1977 Department of
Commerce Benchmark Survey found that approximately fourteen per-
cent of all U.S. foreign affiliates were subject to TRIMs. 221 However,
a 1982 Department of Commerce study found only seven and six-
tenths percent were subject to performance requirements. 222
Finally, even the effect of TRIMs is uncertain; studies have yielded
conflicting results. For general investment incentives, a 1981 CIME
study found that investment incentives and related preconditions and
performance requirements have "only a small influence" on either the
decision to invest abroad or on the form of the investment. 223 Such
measures can, however, impact location decisions within global re-
gions as well as the size and timing of investments. 224 Similarly, with
respect to several TRIMs,225 a CIME study found that while local
content or export performance requirements may discourage green-
field investment, the same measures may actually encourage additional
investment by established enterprises. 226 The study concluded that, in
the aggregate, TRIMs do not have a major impact on investment deci-
sions though they may significantly affect the behavior of individual
enterprises and may influence the choice of location or the form of the
investment.227 They may also have a greater impact on decisions to
invest in developing countries rather than in OECD Member
Countries.228
In contrast to the CIME study, one commentator has read the
findings of a recent World Bank study of investment incentives and
performance requirements to indicate that these measures are effective
for host countries. 229 Dr. Stephen Guisinger concludes that invest-
ment incentives do affect the location of new investments and that per-
formance requirements alter both investment and operational
decisions of multinational enterprises. 230 However, these conclusions
have been identified as contradictory to the results of several studies,
221. Id. at 5.
222. E. GRAHAM & P. KRUGMAN, supra note 36, at 103.
223. 1984 REVIEW, supra note 122, at 49.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 50 (Host country measures included local content or servicing requirements, limi-
tations on imports, export requirements, international product mandate requirements, and tech-
nology transfer requirements. Home country measures included buy-national laws and other
incentives and disincentives).
226. Id. at 50-51.
227. Id. at 51.
228. Id.
229. Guisinger, Investment Incentives and Performance Requirements: They Matter, 20 CTC
REP., Autumn 1985, at 38, 42.
230. Id.
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including ones done by the OECD and by the U.N. Centre on Trans-
national Corporations. They also have been criticized for their poten-
tial to "dangerously mislead" policymakers with respect to the weight
given to incentives in the decision-making process of investors. 231
4. The TRIMs Debate
The parties to the TRIMs debate are the traditional ones in the
GATT: the north (capital exporting countries) seeks greater disci-
pline, while the south (developing countries) seeks freedom to design
its own development strategies. 232 The United States is a chief propo-
nent of a TRIMs agreement in the GATT. As the world's largest
home country for multinational enterprises, the United States has
sought discipline over investment measures to protect the interests of
its corporations. As expressed by Congress, U.S. objectives for invest-
ment in the Uruguay Round are to reduce or eliminate artificial or
trade-distorting barriers to investment, to expand the principle of na-
tional treatment, to reduce unreasonable barriers to establishment, and
to develop rules for the free flow of investment and for the reduction of
TRIMs. 233 These objectives, however, have had to conform to the
limited mandate won at Punta del Este.
The United States seeks the prohibition of certain investment
measures both as a means to clarify existing GATT obligations and as
a way to broaden the scope of the GATT with respect to investment.
For the United States, an unequivocal statement on certain practices
would increase predictability in the GATT dispute settlement process
and would generally increase the pressure on countries to remove
measures inconsistent with GATT. Further, the United States would
like to clarify the use of incentives to "buy" TRIMs. It is unclear just
how broad GATT coverage is of tax breaks and other incentives used
to influence investment or to indirectly modify trade behavior. 234 Fi-
nally, it may be that the United States desires TRIMs talks, regardless
of the eventual scope or substance of commitments reached, because
any discussion of investment in a GATT context could operate as a
231. Farrell, Incentives and Foreign Investment Decisions: An Opposing View, 20 CTC REP.,
Autumn 1985, at 39, 41-42.
232. Given changes in the make-up and direction of investment flows, it has been isserted
that "the strongest advocates and opponents of new restrictions on TRIMs are representing not
so much their present concerns as those of a decade ago." E. Graham & P. Krugman, supra note
200, at 153.
233. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1 101(b)(l 1),
102 Stat. 1107, 1124 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(11) (1991))..
234. But see the discussion of the ITALIAN TRACTORS PANEL, infra notes 261-62 and accom-
panying text (indicating that such coverage is broad).
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symbolic precedent for expanding that discussion in future GATT
rounds.
The United States has taken the most aggressive position on
TRIMs. It has proposed a two-tiered discipline, prohibiting certain
TRIMs and subjecting others to a test for their "effect" on trade ("ef-
fects test"). 235 Prohibited measures would fall into three classes. The
first class purports to elaborate existing GATT article III and XI dis-
ciplines; it would proscribe domestic content and purchase or use re-
quirements, manufacturing requirements, production or technology
use restrictions, technology transfer requirements, domestic sales re-
quirements, and trade balancing requirements.236 The second class
would prohibit export performance requirements and product man-
dating.237 A third class would forbid any other measure which "inher-
ently" restricts or distorts trade.238 Examples include conditions on
access to foreign exchange or on remittances tied to the import or ex-
port behavior of an enterprise.
All other TRIMs would be subject to the so-called "effects test."' 239
Under this standard, a party could bring a claim that an investment
measure had an adverse effect on its trade, regardless of whether the
effect amounted to nullification or impairment of its benefits under
GATT article XXIII.240 Domestic equity requirements, company-
specific remittance and exchange restrictions, and restrictions on pro-
duction have been listed as nonexhaustive examples of such meas-
ures.24' To prevent such a test from swallowing the GATT altogether,
the United States proposes to define "investment measure." The defi-
nition is broad and would include establishment and operating restric-
tions, the most encompassing of the five national investment
controls.242
235. Communication from the United States to the GA TT Negotiating Group on Trade-Re-
lated Investment Measures, MTN.GNG/NGI2/W/24, 4-6 (1990) (on file USTR) [hereinafter
U.S. Submission].
236. Id. at 4-5.
237. Id. at 5.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 5-6.
240. Id. at 6. See notes 274-76 and accompanying text.
241. Id. at 5.
242. An "investment measure" is any measure maintained (Le., provided for by laws, regula-
tions, judicial decisions, administrative rulings, or policy statements) or applied by a contracting
party
(a) as a term or condition of permitting an investment in its territory;
(b) in connection with the establishment of a company, or the making or expanding of any
investment;
(c) as a condition for the receipt of an incentive (*) or services necessary for the conduct of
business;
(d) as a condition for the continued operation of a company.
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The European Community supports a TRIMs agreement but is
less enthusiastic than the United States, in part because of French and
British domestic content rules designed to restrain market penetration
by Japanese auto and electronics manufacturers, particularly by so-
called "screwdriver operations" (low value-added assembly plants).243
The Nordic countries and Japan have both generally favored some
form of prohibition of TRIMs.244
Developing countries245 oppose TRIMs disciplines as largely un-
necessary, as inimical to their development interests, and as a one-
sided approach which fails to account for the restrictive business prac-
tices of multinational enterprises.246 India, Egypt, the Philippines,
and, to a lesser degree, Australia are the principal TRIMs agreement
opponents. 247 A TRIMs agreement is considered inappropriate be-
cause the mandate of the Negotiating Group is to study "trade-re-
lated" investment measures and so, by definition, a TRIM must have a
trade effect. In such a case, these countries believe that existing
GATT dispute settlement provisions for nullification or impairment of
benefits are adequate. 248
India has asserted that prohibition is a rarely used discipline in the
GATT and beyond the mandate of the Group.249 If TRIMs are to be
disciplined at all, India argues, they should be subject only to an "ef-
fects test," i.e., a test for their actual effect on trade flows. India con-
cedes only that export performance requirements, local content
requirements, and trade balancing requirements may, in some circum-
stances, adversely distort trade. 250  Any party imposing a measure
found to distort trade would be required only to eliminate the distor-
tive effect of that measure.
*It is understood that this Agreement does not establish disciplines on investment incentives
per se.
Id. at 9.
243. See Hayes, supra note 210, at 1I.
244. Id. at 17, 19. Given U.S. and EC hostility towards Japanese investment, Japan would
be well-advised to take a lead role in pressing for international investment rules. See infra note
36.
245. Opposition to TRIMs is generally voiced by developing countries who maintain that
"current GATT TRIMs rules seem to work rather well and that not much modification is
needed." This view has been supported by Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, China, Colombia,
Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Yugoslavia. The Role of Trade-
Related Investment Measures, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 568 (1990).
246. See, e.g., Indian Submission, supra note 206.
247. Egypt and India Continue to Oppose TRIMs Agreement Supported by Developed Coun-
tries, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1737 (1990).
248. See, e.g., Also in the News, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 565, 568 (Apr. 18, 1990).
249. Indian Submission, supra note 206, at 4-6.
250. See id. at 9, 11, 14.
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India views performance requirements as "the basic mechanism for
harmonizing the foreign direct investment and technology flows with
[a country's] national development objectives and priorities." 25' For
India, performance requirements are one of several tools necessary for
developing countries to improve their economic positions. It argues
that in practice these programs are often combined with incentives in a
way both to attract industry and to suit a country's individual devel-
opment needs. It is in the interest both of the investor and of the host
country to strike a deal favorable to each. 252
Finally, India asserts that the Negotiating Group must also de-
velop a position on the restrictive business practices of multinational
enterprises.253 So-called restrictive business practices include corpo-
rate policies which carve out global regions as markets for specified
members of a corporate group, or which designate corporate suppliers
for foreign subsidiaries based on the global strategy of the corporation,
rather than on the economic environment in which the subsidiary op-
erates. Restrictive business practices by parent companies also include
limits on technology transfers, restraints on licensing by subsidiaries,
and transfer pricing policies which may reduce tax and other revenues
to host governments.
V. NEGOTIATING INVESTMENT IN A TRADE AGREEMENT:
STRUGGLING WITH LITERALISM
The nature of the TRIMs discussions is the result of investment
issues forced through the sieve of a trade agreement. As stated above,
countries impose five controls on foreign investment in their territo-
ries. While the list of thirteen measures suggested by the United States
and others includes measures from each of the five classes of national
investment controls, the requirement to show the "trade-relatedness"
of each of these measures relegates the potential scope of the negotia-
tions from general national investment controls to primarily a subset
of operating requirements: performance requirements related to trade.
In the Model BIT, these measures are largely covered by a single
paragraph. 254
251. Id. at 4.
252. Id. at 5.
253. Id. at 6-7.
254. Model BIT, supra note 8, art. II, para. 5. See supra part III(A)(2). It is not clear,
however, whether the Model BIT proscribes performance requirements achieved by the offer of
an incentive rather than a formal requirement. For example, a country might offer a tax holiday
to enterprises upon exporting a certain percentage of domestic production. Such an incentive
would clearly encourage a company to export but would not necessarily constitute a "require-
ment" under the BIT.
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While the battle for the right to frame the investment question in
the Uruguay Round may have been won by the literalists, the war is
not yet over. The very significant task remains to reach an agreement
on the terms of a TRIMs agreement. Arguably, the success of the
conflict will be determined by the specific provisions (and their effect
on governmental and private behavior). It is to this struggle that this
article now turns.
This part examines the functionalist and literalist approaches to
structuring a TRIMs agreement in light of the language and practice
of the GATT. The United States has proposed a two-tiered, prohibi-
tion and effects test, discipline. Developing countries oppose any
change in the GATT and accordingly only support an effects test as
provided for by GATT article XXIII.2s5 This Part evaluates these ap-
proaches and assesses the compatibility of a TRIMs agreement with
existing international trade and investment law.
A. Prohibition in a TRIMs Agreement
As seen in part III, agreements for the liberalization of investment
achieve their ends by guaranteeing national and MFN treatment to
economic actors: people and enterprises. While no measure is applied
in a vacuum, i.e., all government measures apply to these actors at
some point, the focus of the GATT is products. Thus, from the start,
those who would attempt to craft provisions to liberalize investment
must pursue unconventional means. Prohibition is such an approach.
1. Prohibition to Improve Predictability
Prohibition is an opportunity to clarify GATT provisions as they
relate to investment, and thereby to improve the predictability and effi-
ciency of the GATT dispute settlement process. 256 Prohibition, how-
255. Contracting Parties have recourse to the GAIT where the benefits accruing under the
agreement have been nullified or impaired by another Contracting Party. GATT, supra note 1,
art. XXIII.
256. "[H]aving regard to the objectives of Articles III and XI of the General Agreement,"
the U.S. would prohibit measures which:
(a) require a given level or percentage of domestic content, the purchase or supply of goods
from domestic sources in preference to imports, or the substitution of domestic goods for
imported goods;
(b) require the mixture, processing or use of products in ways which require, directly or
indirectly, that a specified amount or proportion of any product be supplied by domestic
sources;
(c) require the manufacture of particular foods in the territory of that party;
(d) restrict the production of particular goods or the use of particular technology;
(e) require the transfer, use or licensing of a particular technology or process for local
production;
(f) require the sale of a given level or percentage of production in the territory of that party;
or
(g) require exports or foreign exchange earnings as a condition for importing.
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ever, is a discipline already provided for in the GATT. A complainant
alleging a violation of GATT articles benefits from a presumption that
measures inconsistent with the GATT nullify or impair benefits under
the General Agreement and give rise to article XXIII dispute settle-
ment rights.257 Such a presumption is referred to as prima facie nulli-
fication or impairment and may be relied upon regardless of the actual
trade effect of the inconsistent measure.258 In effect, this presumption
shifts the burden of persuasion from the complainant to the respon-
dent, who must then refute the allegations or justify its inconsistent
behavior. The effect of this shift is tantamount to a prohibition disci-
pline. Under this framework it becomes critical to know how GATT
practice has defined the contours of GATT obligations.
The language and practice of the GATT form a "common law"
which, for a trade agreement, is surprisingly favorable to the interests
of investors subjected to TRIMs. 259 Article 111(4) contains the na-
tional treatment obligation, which provides, in relevant part:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.260
In what has been a landmark for establishing the broad reach of
the national treatment article, the Italian Tractors Panel261 ruled that
U.S. Submission, supra note 235, art. I, para. 2. This list obviously ranges in its adherence to the
GAIT: (a) and (b) follow GATT article III paragraphs 4 and 5 rather closely while (e) is not
apparent as an articulation of either article III or XI.
257. "In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under the General
Agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impair-
ment." CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCU-
MENTS Supp. No. 26, at 210, 216; annex I, para. 5 (1978-79) (Understanding Regarding
Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, annex I, para. 5, adopted Nov.
28, 1979) [hereinafter Understanding Regarding Notification]. Nullification or impairment of
benefits gives rise to a right of recourse under GATT article XXIII. GATT, supra note 1, art.
XXIII.
258. The FIRA Panel, for example, did not undertake an inquiry into the actual "effects" of
the measures on trade. Instead, it found this sort of inquiry "not directly relevant" because a
violation of the GATT is "presumed to have an adverse impact on other contracting parties."
CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS
Supp. No. 30, at 167 (1982-83) (Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act,
Report of the Panel adopted on Feb. 7, 1984) [hereinafter FIRA PANEL]. See also R. Hudec,
Retaliation Against "Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices: The New Section 301 and GA TT
Nullification and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REV. 461, 484, n. 65 (1975).
259. See also Fontheim & Gadbaw, supra note 208, at 143, 158 (asserting that all trade-
related performance requirements violate one GATT article or another).
260. GATT, supra note 1, art. 111(4).
261. CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCu-
MENTS Supp. No. 7, at 60 (1959) (Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Ma-
chinery, Report of the Panel adopted on Oct. 23, 1958) [hereinafter ITALIAN TRACTORS PANEL]
(finding Italian credit program offering more favorable loan terms to purchasers of domestic
[Vol. 12:743
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the operative word in this provision was "affecting:"
[T]he text of [article III] paragraph 4 referred... to laws and regulations
and requirements affecting internal sale, purchase, etc., and not to laws,
regulations and requirements governing the conditions of sale or
purchase. The selection of the word "affecting" would imply, in the
opinion of the Panel, that the drafters of the Article intended to cover in
paragraph 4 not only the laws and regulations which directly governed
the conditions of sale or purchase but also any laws or regulations which
might adversely modify the conditions of competition between the do-
mestic and imported products on the internal market. 262
Thus, while the national treatment article refers to products, the
value of the provision for investors should not be underestimated. It is
broad enough to cover "any laws or regulations which might adversely
modify the conditions of competition between the domestic and im-
ported products." Further, a recent GATT Panel concluded that
withholding an advantage (suspension of dumping proceedings) is tan-
tamount to a "requirement" under article 111(4). While this decision
has not been adopted by the Contracting Parties, it is further evidence
that GATT panels give broad reading to article 111.263
In addition to a favorable interpretation of the fundamental nature
of the national treatment obligation, GATT practice also offers spe-
cific guidance. In examining the Canadian Foreign Investment Re-
view Act of 1973 (FIRA), a GATT Panel ruled that undertakings to
purchase from domestic manufacturers or suppliers constitute "re-
quirements" inconsistent with GATT article III(4).264
Canada had passed its investment law "in recognition [of] the ef-
fect [of foreign control of Canadian industry] on the ability of Canadi-
ans to maintain effective control over their economic environment. ' 265
Under the FIRA, only that foreign investment which was likely to be
of "significant benefit to Canada" was permitted. 266 Accordingly,
when Gannett wanted to acquire a Canadian billboard company it
committed to purchase its newsprint for its U.S. operations from Ca-
nadian sources, and when Apple Computer wished to enter the Cana-
dian market it agreed to buy Canadian-made parts.267
tractors than to purchasers of imported tractors inconsistent with the national treatment
obligation).
262. Id. at 64.
263. In the Screwdriver Case, the Panel ruled that the practice of offering to suspend an-
tidumping proceedings on condition of an agreement to purchase goods from domestic sources
was tantamount to a requirement under article 111(4) and, therefore, GATT-inconsistent. Screw-
driver Panel Decision, supra note 37, at 74, para. 5.21.
264. FIRA PANEL, supra note 258, at 158-61.
265. Id. at 142.
266. Id.
267. McCulloch & Owen, supra note 46, at 340. The Panel found that the FIRA did not
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While the effect of the FIRA Panel decision was to outlaw domes-
tic purchase requirements on national treatment grounds, the reason-
ing of the Panel offers less cause for functionalist rejoice. The Panel
stressed that its holding was not designed to protect the interests of
foreign investors but only to ensure that national treatment was ac-
corded goods originating in any other Contracting Party.268 The
FIRA Panel ruled that domestic purchase requirements infringed the
rights of exporters who would otherwise have supplied the investor,
rather than the rights of the investor itself.269 Domestic purchase re-
quirements would appear clearly to violate the GATT after this deci-
sion. The decision does not, however, represent a significant
ideological endorsement of functionalism.
In contrast to article 111(4) and its reference to measures "affect-
ing" sales and purchases, the language of article XI(l) is certain:
prohibitions or restrictions on the importation or exportation of prod-
ucts of a Contracting Party are forbidden. Article XI provides in rele-
vant part:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or
other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting
party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other
contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product
destined for the territory of any other contracting party. 270
A GATT Panel found that "restrictions" is broad enough to in-
clude administrative guidance as practiced by the Japanese Ministry of
International Trade and Industry and other informal practices.27'
However, the FIRA Panel rejected an argument that the article also
expressly require undertakings by investors but that as a matter of practice nearly all major
proposals included such undertakings. FIRA PANEL, supra note 258, at 166.
268. For the Panel, "[t]he purpose of article 111(4) is not to protect the interests of the for-
eign investor but to ensure that goods originating in any other contracting party benefit from
treatment no less favorable than domestic (Canadian) goods, in respect of the requirements that
affect their purchase (in Canada)." FIRA PANEL, supra note 258, at 160. The panel concluded
that "the national treatment obligations of article III of the General Agreement do not apply to
foreign persons or firms but to imported products and serve to protect the interests of producers
and exporters established on the territory of any contracting party." Id. at 167.
269. Id. at 158-61, 165-67.
270. GATT, supra note 1, art. XI(l).
271. In its review of Japan's implementation of the Japan/US Arrangement on Trade in
Semi-Conductor Products, the Panel found that, by its intricate system of administrative gui-
dance and monitoring, the Government of Japan had instituted a "complex of measures [that]
exhibited the rationale as well as the essential elements of a formal system of export control."
The lack of binding legal obligations was a distinction "in form rather than substance because the
measures were operated in a manner equivalent to mandatory requirements." CONTRACTING
PARTIES TO THE GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS Supp. No. 35, at
116, 157-58 (1987-88) (Japan-Trade in Semiconductors, Report of the Panel adopted on May 4,
1988).
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prohibits export requirements. 272
The above decisions indicate substantial rights for investors subject
to discriminatory investment measures. In terms of national treat-
ment, there may be some value to a provision in a TRIMs agreement
which expressly forbids domestic purchase requirements. The FIRA
Panel ruled against these measures in the interest of forgone imports,
not to protect investors. In theory, therefore, a per se prohibition
would relieve a party subject to a domestic purchase requirement from
the burden of showing that the requirement had infringed the GATT
rights of another. As a practical matter, an express prohibition of do-
mestic purchase requirements would be of value only to those in-
vestors who would otherwise import from countries not party to the
GATT. GATT article III already protects the products of other Con-
tracting Parties from this sort of discrimination.
With respect to incentives, the Italian Tractors and FIRA Panels
indicate that an incentive to encourage an investor to discriminate in
its trade is actionable under article III. If a TRIMs agreement pro-
vides for incentives, drafters would be well advised to note the flexibil-
ity of past GATT panels and not to attempt to specify prohibited
incentives. To define specifically the scope of the word "requirement"
would probably do more to aid those wishing to circumvent their com-
mitments than to clarify GATT obligations.
For article XI, a TRIMs agreement could provide security to in-
vestors if certain measures were specifically proscribed as nonexhaus-
tive examples of "prohibitions or restrictions." To list measures under
this article would not do violence to its terms, nor would it confuse the
integrity of the article with patches of functionalist improvements.
Accordingly, as proposed by the United States, it would be useful to
investors to prohibit technology transfer requirements, domestic sales
requirements, and restrictions on access to foreign exchange (and on
importation) tied to export levels. 273
A danger exists that prohibition of specific measures in a TRIMs
agreement could imply that unlisted investment measures do not vio-
late the agreement. This interpretation would effectively eliminate the
right of a party to argue prima facie nullification or impairment of
GATT rights for any unlisted measures, and the complainant would
then shoulder the burden to persuade a panel that a measure has nulli-
fied or impaired its GATT benefits. To be effective, any list of pro-
scribed measures must therefore be expressly nonexhaustive.
272. FIRA PANEL, supra note 258, at 164.
273. U.S. Submission, supra note 235, art. I(2)(e)-(g).
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2. Prohibition as a Surrogate for Functionalist Investment Rules
In addition to predictability, prohibition offers functionalists an
opportunity to circumvent their GATT literalist mandate. By prohib-
iting a measure outright, no proof of trade-relatedness would be
needed, and investment liberalization could be achieved. For example,
agreement might be reached to proscribe certain technology transfer
requirements or exchange restrictions having only tenuous effects on
trade. While this approach is facially appealing, it is largely ad hoc
and lacks a conceptual framework to support substantive discussions
of investment in the future. The result may be to freeze future invest-
ment discussions as literalists reject attempts to revisit the investment
question in a non-TRIMs framework. In such a case, the victory of
prohibition would be pyrrhic. The solution to this problem is for func-
tionalists to stress that any TRIMs agreement is not an investment
agreement. As conceived, a TRIMs agreement would be a trade
agreement.
Functionalists would be justified in not taking too aggressive a po-
sition on prohibition, lest a more aggressive position confuse the differ-
ence between TRIMs and investment for the future. The United
States has proposed both export performance requirements and prod-
uct mandating for prohibition under the agreement. 274 Prohibition of
these measures would expand existing GATT obligations - the FIRA
Panel found no GATT obligation violated by export requirements -
but, as measures per se affecting exports, these prohibitions would
nonetheless be consistent with the traditional role of the GATT.
B. Effects Test in a TRIMs Agreement
Both literalists and functionalists have proposed the inclusion of an
effects test in a TRIMs agreement. Each camp has a different instru-
mental end for including such a test; neither camp should prevail.
1. Effects Test as a Functionalist Tool
The United States and others have proposed to subject all invest-
ment measures not prohibited per se by a TRIMs agreement to a test
for an effect on trade. 275 The GATT, however, already protects
against the nullification or impairment of trade benefits, and as con-
cluded by the FIRA Panel, this coverage includes the adverse trade
effects of investment measures. In order to expand upon the GATT,
therefore, proponents of an effects test propose to reduce the burden of
274. Id., art. 1(3).
275. The effects test is articulated in article II of the U.S. Submission. Id., paras. 5-6.
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proof for complainants below that of GATT article XXIII. Under the
U.S. proposal, parties would violate the agreement by applying an in-
vestment measure which "adversely affects ... trade," defined to in-
clude an investment measure which:
a. restricts or displaces imports;
b. restricts, displaces or requires exports; or
c. nullifies or impairs any benefits accruing directly or indirectly
to a contracting party under the General Agreement or this
Agreement, taking into account imports or exports which would
have occurred had the measure not been imposed. 276
This construction would effectively add a new injury test to the
GATT, according to which a party, to prevail, need only show that a
measure is an investment measure277 and that it has had some effect on
imports or exports. Not only is the GATT already overburdened with
injury tests, but also the legitimacy of this test is suspect. If a measure
neither per se violates the GATT or the TRIMs agreement nor nulli-
fies or impairs GATT benefits, then why prohibit its effects? 278 The
answer is clear. By minimizing the "trade-relatedness" of covered in-
vestment measures, such an effects test would act as a back door to
expand the coverage of the TRIMs agreement despite the TRIMs Ne-
gotiating Group's limited mandate. This approach would enable func-
tionalists to reach investment and would establish the foundation for a
presumption that a TRIMs agreement is an investment agreement
rather than simply a clarification of the GATT.
2. Effects Test as a Literalist Tool
Opponents to the discussion of investment in the GATT argue that
a test for adverse trade effects is the only appropriate standard for
regulating a measure under the GATT and that such a test is already
adequately expressed for TRIMs by existing GATT articles.279 These
countries would reject the reduced effects test proposed by the United
States. Instead, they would limit the regulation of investment meas-
276. Id., art. 11(5).
277. See the U.S. Proposal's definition of "investment measure," supra note 242. This defini-
tion is broad and would cover many aspects of the five national investment controls. It can be
asked whether the lower "effects test" standard would also swallow the GATT.
278. Under the TRIMs agreement, the GAT" would no longer operate solely to protect the
tariff concessions of the parties from circumvention, but by also prohibiting the effects of meas-
ures that do not rise to the level of an infringement of a tariff concession, the TRIMs agreement
would begin to protect investors rather than products. This is an attempt to achieve functionalist
ends by literalist means, but it is misguided because the link to a simple change in the trade
behavior of an investment is neither a rational nor an easily measurable way of identifying objec-
tionable discrimination.
279. See, e.g., Indian Submission, supra note 206, at 1-3; Also in the News, supra note 248.
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ures to those with a trade effect inconsistent with the GATT. This
approach, however, would eviscerate a TRIMs agreement entirely be-
cause any measure, whether applied to investment, services, immigra-
tion, or any other area is already potentially subject to GATT scrutiny
if it has an effect on goods trade. A TRIMs agreement limited in the
manner proposed by India would contribute nothing to the GATT.
More important, a literalist effects test threatens to weaken existing
GATT dispute settlement provisions. This is so because the GATT
allows complaining parties to shift the burden of persuasion to the
respondent upon a showing of a GATT-inconsistent practice. Viola-
tion of a GATT obligation is deemed prima facie nullification or im-
pairment of the GATT under article XXIII.28o If the TRIMs
agreement were to subject all investment measures to an effects test,
this could effectively shift the burden back to the complainant by mak-
ing a trade effect a necessary element of its complaint. If the TRIMs
agreement also elaborates existing GATT articles, e.g., article III,
complainants might lose the benefit of the prima facie nullification or
impairment presumption.
Whether framed by functionalists or literalists, an effects test is
inappropriate for a TRIMs agreement. An effects test would be con-
trary to the general proposition found in the agreements discussed in
part III that an investment agreement should minimize discriminatory
treatment regardless of the effect of the discrimination on an enter-
prise's trade behavior. In the GATT context, an effects test would be
a redundant and weak discipline which could threaten an already frail
dispute settlement process.
C. Compatibility of a TRIMs Agreement with Other Trade and
Investment Agreements
A TRIMs agreement must operate both as an agreement within
the GATT and as an addition to existing international trade and in-
vestment law.
1. A TRIMs Agreement in the GATT
The literalist orientation of the TRIMs mandate makes it likely
that the provisions of the agreement will, subject to the possible effects
on prima facie presumptions, comport with the GATT as it exists to-
day. A possibility does exist, however, that the agreement would con-
flict with GATT rules on antidumping and subsidies.
Dumping occurs when the "products of one country are intro-
280. Understanding Regarding Notification, supra note 257, at 216.
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duced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal
value of the products";281 export performance requirements oblige a
company to export and may cause it to engage in dumping, at least in
the short-run. Antidumping proceedings entail the burdensome task
of showing material injury to domestic industry as well as proving less
than normal-value pricing. Prohibition of export performance re-
quirements in a TRIMs agreement could encourage parties experienc-
ing competitive difficulties to charge other Contracting Parties with
"inducing" enterprises to export as an easier alternative. There is also
some potential for overlap between TRIMs and subsidies commit-
ments if the TRIMs agreement should cover TRIMs bought by incen-
tives. While an incentive may not rise to a subsidy under the relevant
GATT provisions and Subsidies Code, it may constitute a "require-
ment" to export and be forbidden by a TRIMs agreement.
Suffice it to say that services are clearly outside a literalist's view of
the GATT and yet are being negotiated in the Uruguay Round. A
bifurcated effort (TRIMs and Services) to reach investment controls
may lead to forum shopping problems, particularly because invest-
ment measures are often applied by countries across the board. Devel-
oped countries will press hard to include investment in services within
the scope of an agreement. A more effective approach would establish
an umbrella agreement covering goods, services, and investment and
would emphasize non-discriminatory treatment of nationals and enter-
prises. It appears, however, politically necessary at this point to con-
tinue to package investment controls as services issues.282 Difficult
questions might arise, however, for dual output enterprises. When
IBM's access to foreign exchange in Brazil is limited to its export earn-
ings, is this a restriction on trade in computers, or is it a limitation on
the enterprise's ability to deliver its management services, or both?
Should the United States bring a complaint under the TRIMs agree-
ment or the GATS agreement? Does it have a right to retaliate against
the goods of Brazil, the services, or both? The output orientation of
the TRIMs and services discussions leads to these types of questions.
2. A TRIMs Agreement in International Law
In addition to the need for a TRIMs agreement to be internally
consistent with the GATT, the agreement must also function as a part
of existing international law. If the GATT MFN clause applies to a
TRIMs agreement (as it will if the agreement is incorporated as an
281. GATT, supra note 1, art. VI.
282. See sources cited supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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amendment to the GATT), then Contracting Parties maintaining BIT
and FCN programs, as well as those adhering to the OECD Codes,
might be required to extend certain of the benefits of these agreements
to all GATT Contracting Parties.
This creates a tension for those who would view a TRIMs amend-
ment as a functionalist advance. The more the amendment is consid-
ered an investment agreement, the less leverage countries with liberal
investment rules have to encourage potential free-riders to change.
National and MFN treatment for investments might be required of
many Contracting Parties regardless of whether the home countries of
the investors reciprocate such treatment.28 3
VI. CONCLUSION
The reference to the effects on trade in the mandate for the Negoti-
ating Group has doomed the TRIMs negotiations to insignificant ad-
vances in liberalizing its namesake "investment. ' 2 4 The limit on the
scope of the TRIMs negotiations is a literalist victory. For capital-
exporting countries, the prohibition of export performance require-
ments alone may be sufficient reason to endorse an agreement on
TRIMs as an adequate attempt to regulate investment in the GATT.
However, such a position would threaten the very future these coun-
tries desire.
To view the likely result of the TRIMs talks as an investment
agreement would be to grant that investment can be discussed in liter-
alist terms. This is not the case. It would be better to concede to the
283. The cost of such a loss in investment leverage is far less than a comparable loss of rights
would be for trade in products. This is so because it would be difficult for a country to threaten
another with more restrictive investment policies if the other fails to liberalize its investment
laws. Once an investment is made, it is relatively difficult to restrict, and any restriction may in
fact harm domestic employment or economic performance. In the case of products, however, it
is very useful to be able to threaten to restrict the importation of certain products in order to
force the exporter of those products to liberalize its trade policies, and even its investment poli-
cies. Nevertheless, the call for reciprocity in investment is growing, and so is the tension. See,
e.g., Bergsten, Coming Investment Wars?, 53 FOREIGN AFF. 135 (1974) (proposing a New Inter-
national Economic Order in part to stem possible future investment wars); H.R. 1396, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. H1669 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1991) (bill to amend the Trade Act
of 1974 to require reciprocity for investment).
284. This was not a necessary result of the relationship to trade inherent in the words "trade-
related investment measures." The GATT Contracting Parties are also discussing trade-related
intellectual property rights (TRIPs). While intellectual property is also considered a "new topic"
in the GATT, in contrast to the mandate given to the TRIMs Group, the mandate for the TRIPs
Negotiating Group anticipates progress. TRIPs negotiators are charged with clarifying GATT
provisions and with elaborating, as appropriate, new rules and disciplines "taking into account
the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights." See Minis-
terial Declaration, supra note 205, at 9. In contrast, no mention is made in the TRIMs mandate
of an obligation to consider the need to promote protection of investment rights - only the
effects on trade are to be considered by the TRIMs group. See supra notes 205-207 and accom-
panying text.
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literalists their victory - blocking the introduction of investment
rules into the GATT - and to declare a successful agreement on
trade-related performance requirements, 285 than to allow literalism to
shape the future discussion of investment in the GATT. For those
wishing to modernize the rules of economic relations, to add a TRIMs
agreement to the GATT would be akin to improving transportation by
putting wings on a train - despite an advancement in apparent form,
little improvement would be made to function. The hulk would con-
tinue to lumber its familiar route, its inadequacies now glaring. What
is required is an attitudinal change by the Contracting Parties to em-
brace functionalism.
Other functionalist movements are afoot in the GATT with both
direct and indirect value for investors. Services talks not only symbol-
ize a dramatic shift away from a products orientation in the GATT,
but also are likely to include investment in services in the scope of the
final agreement. Both of these subjects are clearly outside a literalist
conception of the GATT. 286 Countries with an interest in broad in-
vestment rules may do well to allow the services talks to operate as
their "Trojan horse. '' 287 To continue to press investment in a TRIMs
context might add rigidity to the distinction between goods and serv-
ices rules, and thereby artificially constrain the evolution of the Gen-
eral Agreement. Also, intellectual property is being discussed in the
so-called Trade-Related Intellectual Property (TRIPs) talks. It ap-
pears that this agreement will contain an obligation to accord both
national and MFN/non-discriminatory treatment to persons rather
than products, 288 a significant functionalist advance representing a
move away from an output orientation towards a focus on the treat-
ment of economic actors.
Investment is a reality of the age of the multinational enterprise.
285. The agreement would ideally be called "Agreement on Trade-Related Performance Re-
quirements," rather than "investment measures," so that there would be no mistake that this
agreement neither addresses nor forecloses the future discussion of investment in the GATT.
286. To a significant extent, services negotiations appear to be an attempt to package invest-
ment issues in a manner analogous to the GATT treatment of goods. Thus, while the subject of
services is new to the GATT, the framework for discussing this subject comports with the GATT
framework's orientation towards the output of enterprises (goods in a GATT context; services in
the GATS) rather than protection of the enterprises themselves (as done in the BITs and FCNs).
While the subject is progressive, the approach is literalistic. As the BITs and FCNs demonstrate,
many of the problems faced by service firms would be solved by an agreement on investment
containing non-discrimination provisions. See sources cited supra note 3.
287. Nicolaides points out that an obstacle to the discussion of services in the GATT context
is the fear in developing countries that "multilateral negotiations on the right of establishment
will prove to be the Trojan horse for circumventing national controls on foreign investment." P.
NICOLAIDES, supra note 2, at 92.
288. Interview with Catherine Field, Associate General Counsel, Office of the United States
Trade Representative, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 13, 1990).
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In addition to its role as an agreement for the negotiation of trade and
tariffs, the GATT has become the principal vehicle for the mainte-
nance of peaceful economic relations in the post-war era. If nations
are to continue to minimize the political tensions that arise from eco-
nomic frictions, they must be willing to adapt their conventions for
such purposes to the changing patterns of economic behavior. It is
time to recognize reality and to free the GATT from its moorings as a
trade agreement. If a literalist view of the GATT is so entrenched as
to prevent this progress, then it is time for a new agreement. 289
289. Twenty years ago Goldberg and Kindleberger proposed a "GATT for Investment."
Goldberg & Kindleberger, Toward a GA TTfor Investment: A Proposal for Supervision of the
International Corporation, 2 LAW & POL'Y INT'L. Bus. 295 (1970). The proposal would cover
"taxation, antitrust policy, balance of payment controls, export controls, and securities regula-
tion." Id. at 298. These authors would leave much to the sovereign discretion of nations and are
"unsympathetic" to pressures by countries to have others open their markets to foreign direct
investment. Id. at 297. Van Themaat takes perhaps the more circumspect view in supporting
Professor Jackson's call for an attempt to formulate a new World Trade Charter:
we all know that foreign investments may be both a corollary and an alternative to interna-
tional trade in goods and services. It would therefore be logical, I submit, to have both of
these two subject-matters covered also by a new organization, which then would become an
organization for trade, services and investments.
Van Themaat, Strengthening the International Legal Framework of the GA 7'T-MTN System: A
Comment, 5 STUD. TRANSNAT'L ECON. L. 29 (1988). See also Jackson, Strengthening the Inter-
national Legal Framework of the GA 7T-MTN System: Reform Proposals for the New GA7T
Round, 5 STUD. TRANSNAT'L ECON. L. 21-23 (1988). Cf Rubin, supra note 35, at 16-21 (sug-
gesting that the proposed UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations would enhance
GATT agreements on investment and services).
[Vol. 12:743
